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Be Careful What You Ask For: Attacking
the Constitutionality of the Clean Air
Act Operating Permit Program
LAURA RAPACIOLI*
I. Introduction
In response to the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) disapproval of the Commonwealth of Virginia's (Vir-
ginia) Clean Air Acti (CAA) Title V operating permit pro-
gram,2 Virginia filed two lawsuits challenging the EPA's final
action and the constitutionality of several provisions of the
CAA operating permit program.3 On January 9, 1995, Vir-
ginia initiated a declaratory judgment action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
under 28 U.S.C. section 1331. 4 Simultaneously, Virginia also
* May, 1997 candidate for the J.D. with a certificate in Environmental
Law. This Comment is dedicated to my husband, Mark, who has stood by me
throughout law school, and to my children, Dominick and Samantha, who are
the greatest joy in my life. I would like to thank Mr. David J. Kaplan, Esq. of
the Department of Justice for his assistance in researching the information
used in this Comment.
1. CleanAir Act (CAA) §9 101-618,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1984 & Supp.
V 1993).
2. Title V of the CAA calls for states to implement operating permit pro-
grams to regulate major stationary sources of air pollution. See CAA § 502, 42
U.S.C. § 7661a. The EPA is to administer a federal permit program in those
states which do not submit their own programs as requested. See CAA
§ 502(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(3). See infra sections II.A and ll.B for a dis-
cussion of Title V permit programs.
Virginia submitted its proposed operating permit program to the EPA on
November 12, 1993. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Virginia IlI). Final EPA disapproval of the program was published in the Fed-
eral Register on December 5, 1994. See Clean Air Act Final Disapproval of Op-
erating Permits Program; Commonwealth of Virginia, 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324
(1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
3. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 875 & n.4.
4. In the declaratory judgment action, Virginia challenged the constitu-
tionality of all of Title V, the volatile organic compound (VOC) control strategy,
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petitioned for judicial review of the EPA's final disapproval of
Virginia's permit program in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit.5 In addition to challenging the
EPA's administrative determination that the State's permit
program did not meet the CAA standards, Virginia also
claimed that portions of the CAA itself are unconstitutional. 6
For instance, Virginia asserted that the use of federal high-
way sanctions against states not submitting an approvable
program violates the Spending Clause of the United States
Constitution.7 The complaint also contended that the CAA
permit program requirement that states must grant review
to persons capable of demonstrating standing under Article
the inspection and maintenance programs, the sanctions provisions, and trans-
portation conformity provisions. See Virginia v. United States, 926 F. Supp.
537, 540 (E.D. Va. 1995) (Virginia ). The EPA filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds that the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over Virginia's con-
stitutional claims. Id. The District Court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss
and ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Virginia's constitu-
tional claims. See Virginia I, 926 F. Supp. at 546. On appeal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision. See Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d
517 (4th Cir. 1996) (Virginia IM. The Fourth Circuit relied on a prior decision
which held that, when Congress has named the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals as the exclusive forum for challenging agency action, all legal issues
related to the agency action are to be brought in the circuit court. See Virginia
II, 74 F.3d at 523 (citing Palumbo v. Waste Technologies Indust., 989 F.2d 156,
161 (4th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added). The court noted that Virginia had
launched a facial attack on the CAA, and that such a claim was capable of deci-
sion without resorting to the fact-finding powers of a district court. See Vir-
ginia II, 74 F.3d at 524. The Court of Appeals explained its position by stating
that it could simply remand the case to a district court if development of a fac-
tual record became necessary. See id.
5. See Virginia II, 74 F.3d at 522. Under § 307(b) of the CAA, a petition
for judicial review of "[any] ... final action of the EPA Administrator under this
chapter. . . which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit." See CAA
§ 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
6. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 873.
7. See id. The relevant portion of the United States Constitution reads:
"Congress shall have Power to Lay and Collect Taxes... to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.. ..
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The CAA provides for several different types of
sanctions, including the withholding of certain federal highway funds, to en-
courage the states to submit their own operating permit programs rather than
having the EPA administer a federal program. See CAA § 179(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7509(b). A discussion of the sanctions provisions is provided in section
II-A.2.b of this Comment.
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III of the Constitution infringes on states' Tenth Amendment
rights.8
Along with the constitutional claims, Virginia challenged
the EPA's final decision claiming that the EPA acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in disapproving Virginia's program
submission.9 This Comment addresses only the constitu-
tional claims, however, and does not discuss whether the
EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting Title
V.
8. See Virginia Iff, 80 F.3d at 873. The Tenth Amendment states that
"[tlhe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
The term "standing under Article I" or "Article IH standing" refers to the
requirements that a party must demonstrate in order for a federal court estab-
lished under Article HI of the Constitution (for example, a United States Dis-
trict Court or a Circuit Court of Appeals) to exercise jurisdiction over their
claims. The basic requirements for Article III standing have been set out by the
Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). In
order to demonstrate standing to sue, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact
which is concrete and particularized, causation, and likelihood that the relief
sought, if granted, would redress the injury. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. The
Supreme Court has stated that aesthetic and environmental well-being inter-
ests are sufficient to establish an injury in fact. See id. at 2137.
The EPA also addressed the issue of "prudential standing" in its disap-
proval of Virginia's operating permit program. The doctrine of "prudential
standing" requires that a person seeking to challenge an agency action must
demonstrate that his interests are within the scope of interests sought to be
protected or regulated by Congress. See Clean Air Act Final Disapproval of Op-
erating Permits Program; Commonwealth of Virginia, 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324
(1994) (to be codified at 40 CFR Part 70) (citing Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. EPA, 885 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). EPA agreed that the "pruden-
tial standing" doctrine applied to permit programs but argued that Congress
specifically created a "zone of interest protected by Title V" to include those
people who participated in the comment process. See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324,
62,325 (1994).
9. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 875. Virginia claimed that the EPA's inter-
pretation of the judicial review requirements for state permit programs, set out
in CAA § 502(b)(6), was incorrect. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 876. Virginia
also alleged that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding that
Virginia's judicial review statute was too narrow. See id. In addition to the
above claims, Virginia objected to several other reasons the EPA had listed for
disapproving the permit program. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 875. See infra
section I.C of this Comment for a discussion of the EPA's disapproval of Vir-ginia's program submission.
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In a related case, the State of Missouri filed a federal dis-
trict court action claiming, in part, that the sanctions provi-
sions of the CAA are unconstitutional.10 Although the
Missouri case is in the context of an EPA finding that Mis-
souri failed to submit certain revisions to its state implemen-
tation plan 1 (SIP), the same constitutional challenges
regarding the CAA sanctions provisions raised by Virginia
were also at issue in the Missouri case. 12 Both the Virginia
and the Missouri courts have reached the conclusion that,
facially, the sanctions provisions do not violate either the
Tenth Amendment or the Spending Clause.'3 Although the
Virginia court made no distinction between a facial attack on
the sanctions and an as-applied attack, 14 the Missouri court
did leave the door open for future constitutional analysis by
dismissing Missouri's as-applied claims without prejudice.' 5
The complexity of the recent litigation is indicative of the
intricacy of the statute involved. The CAA has gone through
several major changes since 1967.16 One article has noted
that, in part, the 1990 Amendments were a response to a plea
from state officials for more guidance and direction from the
federal government in dealing with air pollution.17 If there is
one thing the 1990 Amendments gave the states it was direc-
10. See Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
11. States are strongly encouraged to adopt SIPs consisting of state stat-
utes and regulations which will implement the requirements of the federal
CAA. See CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Failure to submit or revise a SIP ac-
cording to statutory or regulatory instructions results in the imposition of sanc-
tions. See CAA § 110(m), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m). Continued failure to submit or
revise a SIP could also result in the EPA administration of the CAA through a
federal implementation plan (FIP). See CAA § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
12. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1322 (noting that Missouri charges that
the sanctions violate the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution).
13. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 883; Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1338.
14. The Fourth Circuit merely found that "the sanctions Virginia faces are
constitutional." Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 883.
15. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1338.
16. A detailed history of the CAA from its 1967 identity as the Air Quality
Act of 1967 through the 1970, 1977, and 1990 Amendments is provided in Steve
Novick and Bill Westerfield, Whose SIP Is It Anyway? State-Federal Conflict In
Clean Air Act Enforcement, 18 W~i. & MARY J. ENvTL. L. 245, 260-68 (1994).
17. See id. at 268.
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tion, and then some. Now that the states and the people have
presumably received what they wanted, at least two states,
Virginia and Missouri, are complaining that they received too
much direction. This Comment explores whether Congress
went too far in its effort to guide the states in the control of
air pollution through the operating permit program or
whether the states merely got what they asked for and can-
not use the Constitution as a weapon to roll back the course
of pollution control. The Comment will focus largely on Title
V and the Virginia cases, but the Missouri decision will be
used to fill in the many gaps left by the Fourth Circuit in its
constitutional analysis.
The constitutional issues addressed by the Missouri and
Virginia courts are particularly relevant in light of a 1996
regulation under the Clean Water Actis (CWA). This regula-
tion amends the requirements for an approvable state pollu-
tant discharge permit system (SPDES) program1 9 to include
the same opportunity for judicial review by interested per-
sons as is available under Article III of the United States
Constitution. 20 Prior to this new regulation, which became
effective in 1996, there was no requirement that a state ad-
ministering an SPDES program include an opportunity for
judicial review as broad as Article III standing.
Although development of state permit programs is not
encouraged as vigorously in the CWA as in the CAA,21 this
18. Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act] (CWA), §§ 101-
607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1984 & Supp. V 1993).
19. Similar to the CAA, the CWA § 502(b) provides for states, rather than
the EPA, to administer a permit program. See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b). In contrast to the strong language urging state adoption of a CAA
permit program, the CWA language, which states, in part, that "the Governor of
each State desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into
navigable waters within its jurisdiction may submit to the [EPA] Administrator
a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and ad-
minister under State law or under an interstate compact." CWA § 402(b), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b) is devoid of incentives for states to submit a permit program of
their own.
20. See Amendment to Requirements for Authorized State Permit Pro-
grams Under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972 (1996) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 123). See supra note 8 for a discussion of Article I
standing requirements.
21. See infra note 104.
1996] 327
5
328 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.14
new regulation has already caused some controversy in Vir-
ginia and elsewhere. 22 For example, in its final rule publica-
tion, the EPA noted that several individuals suggested that
the regulation may unconstitutionally infringe upon states'
rights not to be sued without its consent.23 In answer to this
concern, the EPA stated simply that states that are dissatis-
fied with the new regulation could simply leave the adminis-
tration of a permit program to the federal government. 24
Another concern expressed by those commenting on the rule
was that Virginia was being singled out because, at the time
the rule was proposed, its judicial review statute enacted to
implement the CWA permit program restricted review to an
"owner aggrieved" and effectively barred all others from chal-
lenging the state's issuance of a permit.2 5 This restriction
prompted several environmental groups to petition the EPA
to withdraw approval of Virginia's program.26 The EPA did
note in its final rule that Virginia had amended its statute in
1996,27 but stated that it had not made a final decision as to
whether the Amendment satisfied the new regulation.28
It appears from the above discussion that the stage is set
for a renewed discussion of citizen's standing to review state
environmental agencies' decisions regarding pollution per-
mits. Given the lack of incentive for states to adopt its own
SPDES programs, it is unclear whether the same vigorous
22. See 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972, 20,975-77 (1996).
23. See id. at 20,976.
24. See id.
25. See 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972, 20,978 (1996). See also Amendment to Re-
quirements for Authorized State Permit Programs Under Section 402 of the
Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,588, 14,588-89 (1995) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 123) for the EPA's use of Virginia's standing statute as a rationale for
promulgating the new judicial review regulation.
26. See 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972, 20,973.
27. In fact, Virginia provided for alternate amendment of its SPDES judi-
cial review statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (1ichie 1992). The new
law provides for one version which will be effective until there is a final, non-
appealable decision on Virginia's operating permit judicial review provision and
a second version which would go into effect in the event that the above-men-
tioned final, appealable decision was adverse to Virginia. See id. This latter
version specifically adopts Article I standing requirements in an action for
judicial review of a state decision regarding an SPDES permit. See id.
28. See 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972, 20,973.
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challenges to the CAA will also plague the CWA. However,
there is a possibility that, armed with two favorable deci-
sions, the EPA or Congress may now reexamine other envi-
ronmental statutes to find new ways to encourage states to
regulate the way the EPA itself would. While it is doubtful
that this possibility was envisioned by those who, prior to the
1990 Amendments, requested some direction in implement-
ing the CAA, it may be an answer that many citizens, compa-
nies, and state officials will get in the end.
Since the imposition of sanctions is complete or immi-
nent in at least two states and the new CWA regulations
threaten to further drag out the debate, the constitutionality
of the relevant CAA provisions is a major concern. To effec-
tively examine the issues, Part II of this Comment provides
background information, including the relevant provisions of
the CAA and its legislative histories, regulatory action taken
by the EPA in implementing the state permit program, the
EPA's decisions with regard to Virginia's proposed permit
program, and case law relevant to the constitutional issues.
The constitutional arguments made by Missouri, Virginia,
the EPA, and amici, and the courts' analyses of those argu-
ments, are set out in Part IH. Part IV consists of a legal anal-
ysis of the courts' opinions. Part V discusses the policy
reasons supporting a finding of constitutionality and possible
impacts of a ruling in favor of Virginia and Missouri. Finally,
Part V also concludes that the courts were correct in ruling
against Virginia and Missouri for the legal and practical rea-
sons previously discussed.
II. Background
A. Title V of the Clean Air Act
1. Purpose of and Expectations for the Operating
Permit Program
The CAA was enacted in 1963.29 However, it was not un-
til the 1990 Amendments to the CAA that an operating per-
29. See S. REP. No. 228, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3387 (hereinafter S. REP. 228].
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mit program was established.30 Congress set out two major
reasons for creating an operating permit program.31 First,
Congress claimed that an operating permit program would
provide for easier enforcement of the statutory and regula-
tory requirements of the CAA. 3 2 Second, a permit program
which contained provisions for modifications would create a
more streamlined method for implementing new require-
ments.33 Congress noted that several other major environ-
mental statutes had provisions for the issuance of permits
and permit-like documents and sought to bring the CAA up to
speed with these other statutes. 34
Congress envisioned several benefits to the implementa-
tion of a permit program.3 5 The first anticipated benefit was
that a permit program would make the requirements of the
CAA more enforceable against the regulated entities.36 With-
out a permit program, regulated entities were forced to
search through the provisions of the CAA, federal regula-
tions, and SIPs3 7 to find the requirements applicable to their
30. See S. REP. 228, supra note 29, at 346, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3729. The CAA, prior to the 1990 Amendments, contained provisions requiring
permits only for construction of new and modified major air pollution sources.
See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 346.
34. See S. REP. 228, supra note 29, at 346, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3729. See infra note 104 for a discussion of other environmental statutes utiliz-
ing a permit system.
35. See id. at 347.
36. See id.
37. Under CAA § 110(a), each state must submit to the EPA "a plan which
provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of the primary
and secondary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air
quality control region in that state. See CAA § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a).
SiPs are required to contain, inter alia, emission limitations, monitoring pro-
grams, enforcement mechanisms, and provisions for SIP revisions. See CAA
§ l10(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). SIPs are adopted by each state "after rea-
sonable notice and public hearing." CAA § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). The
EPA has 60 days to review a SIP submission and determine its adequacy. See
CAA § 110(k)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(1)(B). Failing to submit a plan or sub-
mission of an inadequate plan triggers the sanction provisions of the CAA. See
CAA § 179, 42 U.S.C. § 7509. See also CAA § 110(m), U.S.C. § 7410(m). See
infra section HIA2 of this Comment for a discussion of the sanction provisions.
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particular facility.38 Congress noted that the confusion
caused by the unorganized location of compliance require-
ments resulted in extreme difficulty in determining whether
a source was in compliance or not.39 To address this problem,
permits would include both general and industry-specific re-
quirements and set out necessary monitoring, recordkeeping,
and reporting requirements needed to adequately ascertain
the source's compliance. 40
The second benefit to the implementation of a permit
program would be ease in modifying a source's compliance ob-
ligations.41 Congress noted that the current method required
a "double key" system whereby changes were made in the
state's SIP and then approved by the EPA after notice and
comment.42 By requiring the EPA to review permit changes
within ninety days, new obligations would be in place quicker
and with less confusion. 43 Congress also predicted that the
requirement of permit fees would allow the states ample re-
sources for administering their air pollution control
programs.4
Finally, Congress hoped the permit program would assist
states in implementing the new air toxics and acid deposition
programs contained in the 1990 Amendments. 45 These pro-
grams are particularly complex under the 1990 Amendments.
For instance, Congress directly required regulation of 191
38. See S. REP. 228, supra note 29, at 347, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3385, 3730.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 347-48, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C-.AN. 3385, 3730-31.
43. See S. REP. 228, supra note 29, at 347-48, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3730-31. There are actually several methods for permit re-
vision allowed under the CAA. See 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(d)-(e) (1995) for the require-
ments for effecting various types of permit revisions. The state's permit
program must provide the permitting authority with the power to modify a
source's permit. See CAA § 502(b)(5)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5)(D). Also, for
permits which have a term of three or more years, permits are to be updated
when a source's compliance obligations are revised. See CAA § 502(b)(9), 42
U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(9).
44. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 29, at 348, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3731.
45. See id.
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hazardous air pollutants46 and anticipated that there could
be more than 200 categories of major sources of hazardous air
pollutants.47
2. Implementation of Operating Permit Programs
a. Components of an Approvable Program
Section 502 of the CAA required the Administrator of the
EPA to promulgate regulations setting forth the minimum re-
quirements for the operating permit program by November
15, 1991.48 The regulations were to address provisions for
permit applications,49 monitoring and reporting require-
ments, 50 permit fees, 51 state administration of the permit
program,52 permit revisions,53 and operational flexibility.54
46. See id. at 147, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3530. Section
112(b) of the CAA lists the 191 hazardous air pollutants (MAPs) which the EPA
must regulate. See CAA § 112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). The EPA is required to
review the list and add pollutants which pose or may pose a "threat of adverse
human health effects . . . or adverse environmental effects . . . ." CAA
§ 112(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2). The list may also be modified upon petition
by any person. See CAA § 112(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3). To have a sub-
stance added to the list, the petitioner must show (or the Adminitrator may
independently determine) that the pollutant is "known to cause or may reason-
ably be anticipated to cause adverse effects to human health or adverse envi-
ronmental effects." CAA § 112(b)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3)(B). Similarly, to
have a substance removed from the list, the petitioner must demonstrate (or the
Administrator may independently determine) that "there is adequate data on
the health and environmental effects of the substance to determine that... [it]
may not reasonably be anticipated to cause any adverse effects to the human
health or adverse environmental effects." CAA § 112(b)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b)(3)(C).
47. See S. RP. 228, supra note 29, at 148, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
3385, 3531. CAA § 112(c) directs the EPA to promulgate and periodically re-
view and revise a list of categories of sources subject to regulation under CAA
§ 112. See CAA § 112(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c). The EPA published its initial list
of source categories on July 16, 1992. See Initial List of Categories of Sources
Under Section 112(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg.
31,576 (1992). This initial list contained over 150 source categories. See id. at
31,591. The CAA provides for addition and deletion of source categories from
the list. See CAA § 112(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c).
48. See id. § 502(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b).
49. See id. § 502(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(1).
50. See id. § 502(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(2).
51. See id. § 502(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(3).
52. See CAA § 502(b)(4)-(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(4)-(7).
53. See id. § 502(b)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(9).
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The EPA is required to assure that states have "adequate
personnel and funding to administer the program."5 5 The
regulations must also provide for:
[aldequate, streamlined, and reasonable procedures... for
public notice, including offering an opportunity for public
comment and a hearing... and including an opportunity
for judicial review in State court of the permit action by the
applicant, any person who participated in the public com-
ment process, and any other person who could obtain judi-
cial review of that action under applicable law.56
States were required to submit their proposed permit
programs to the EPA no later than November 15, 1993.5 7
Submissions were also to include a legal opinion that the
laws of the state provide sufficient authority for the pollution
control agency to carry out the requirements of the CAA.58
The EPA had one year to approve or disapprove the submit-
ted state programs. 59 Thus, in theory, all state programs
54. See id- § 502(b)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(10).
55. Id. § 502(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(4).
56. Id. § 502(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6). This particular provision is a
main source of the controversy between Virginia and the EPA as the EPA has
determined that Virginia law does not satisfy the stated judicial review require-
ments. See Clean Air Act Disapproval of Operating Permits Program; Com-
monwealth of Virginia, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,183 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 70). Although S. 1630, the Senate bill which eventually became the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, was introduced in September 1989, see 135 CONG.
REc. S11,126, S11,139 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989), the requirement of an opportu-
nity for judicial review in state court of final permit actions emerged in an
amendment offered in May 1990. See 136 CoNG. REc. H2771, H2817 (daily ed.
May 23, 1990) (amendment proposed by Representative Dingell). Prior to this
amendment, the minimum requirement for permit programs was that they con-
tain "adequate procedures for public notice, including offering an opportunity
for public comment and a hearing, on any permit action." 136 Cong. Rec. S27,
872 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990).
57. See CAA § 502(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(1).
58. See id. § 502(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(1).
59. See id. § 502(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(1). If EPA proposes to disap-
prove the program, it must explain the revisions necessary to make the pro-
gram approvable. See id. § 502(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(1).
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should have been in place by November 15, 1994. This has
not happened. 60
3. Sanctions for Failure to Submit an Approvable
Program
States that fail to submit an approvable program by the
statutory deadline have an additional eighteen-month grace
period to submit an acceptable program.61 If a state fails to
submit an approvable program within this grace period, the
EPA must begin applying one of the two sanctions set out in
section 179 of the CAA.62 If the state has still not submitted
an approvable program six months later, both of the sanc-
tions will be applied.63 In addition to these two sanctions, the
Administrator also has the option of withholding air pollution
planning grants authorized under CAA section 105.64 None
of these sanctions are to be applied unless the failure to sub-
mit or disapproval "relates to an air pollutant for which such
60. See infra note 103 for a discussion of the status of the implementation of
the state operating permit programs.
61. See CAA § 502(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(2)(B).
62. Id § 502(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(2)(B). The CAA provides for two
types of sanctions: the withholding of certain federal highway grants and the
imposition of 2:1 offsets on new or modified stationary sources. See infra notes
70-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the sanction provisions of
the CAA work.
The EPA regulations specify the manner in which the sanctions are to be
imposed. See 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(k) (1995), 40 C.F.R. § 70.10(a)(ii) (1995). 40
C.F.R. § 70.10(a)(ii) provides that eighteen months following disapproval of a
state permit program submission, the EPA "will apply such sanctions in the
same manner and with the same conditions as are applicable in the case of a
determination, disapproval, or finding under section 179(a) of the Act." 40
C.F.R. § 70.10(a)(ii). Regulations implementing CAA § 179(a) prescribe that
the EPA will apply the offset sanction first and will only apply the highway
sanction if the deficiency has not been corrected six months after the imposition
of the offsets. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(d)(1) (1995). However, the EPA has the
authority to decide, after notice and comment, that the highway sanction
should be imposed first. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(d)(6) (1995).
63. See id.
64. CAA § 105,42 U.S.C. § 7405. Under this section, the EPA is authorized
to make grants of up to three-fifths of the cost of instituting air pollution control
programs. See id. § 105(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7405(a)(1)(A). The amount of the
grant is determined based on the population, extent of the air pollution prob-
lem, and financial need. See id. § 105(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7405(b)(1).
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area has been designated a nonattainment area."65 The EPA
has been given discretion to apply the sanctions before the
expiration of the eighteen-month grace period.66 If the state
has still failed to submit an approvable program two years
after the initial deadline, the EPA must implement a federal
permit program.67 Although the sanctions clock may be
stopped and reset to zero in some cases, such as when a state
submits an administratively complete SIP revision after the
EPA had made a finding of failure to submit, merely making
a complete submission does not stop the implementation of a
FIP.68 That two-year countdown is halted only upon ap-
proval of the required program.69
Section 179 provides for two types of sanctions.70 The
first sanction is known as the "highway sanction."7 ' A state
subject to highway sanctions is prohibited from receiving fed-
eral funding or grants authorized under Title 23 of the
United States Code for projects that are not "safety
projects."72 In addition to safety projects, a state may still
receive funding for other transportation projects which would
serve to promote air quality improvement.7 3 The statute spe-
cifically lists seven different types of projects for which a state
may receive funding despite imposition of the sanction.
States may receive funding for public transportation pro-
grams, 74 construction of high occupancy vehicle (HOV)
65. Id. § 502(d)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(2)(C). A region is designated a
nonattainment area if the concentration of a criteria pollutant (such as ozone)
exceeds the NAAQS standard.
66. See id. § 502(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(2)(A).
67. See CAA § 502(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(3). The EPA has proposed
regulations which would create the federal operating permit program. See Fed-
eral Operating Permits Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 20,804 (1995) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 55 and 71). Once final, these regulations would be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 71. See id.
68. See Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 522 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996) (Vir-
ginia I) (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122,
1126 & n7 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
69. See id.
70. See CAA § 179, 42 U.S.C. § 7509.
71. See id. § 179(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1).
72. See id. § 179(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A).
73. See id. § 179(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B).
74. See id. § 179(b)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)0B)(i).
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lanes,75 employee trip reduction programs,76 measures to im-
prove traffic flow,77 parking for carpool programs,78 programs
aimed at reducing traffic in downtown areas during rush
hours,79 programs designed to reduce congestion associated
with accidents or breakdowns, 0 and any other project which
would reduce emissions or not promote vehicle use by only
one person.8 '
The second type of sanction listed under CAA section 179
is the imposition of 2:1 offsets for construction of new or modi-
fled sources.8 2 The imposition of 2:1 offsets means that in or-
der for a new or modified source to obtain a construction
permit, a decrease in emissions from sources in the same
nonattainment area equal to twice the amount of emissions
from the new or modified source must be demonstrated.83 If
the offset sanction is imposed, the 2:1 ratio would replace any
other ratio that a new or modified source would be subject to
under the nonattainment provisions of section 173 of the
CAA.84
75. See CAA § 179(b)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(ii).
76. See id. § 179(b)(1)(B)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(iii).
77. See id. § 179(b)(1)(B)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(iv).
78. See id. § 179(b)(1)(B)(v), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(v).
79. See id. § 179(b)(1)(B)(vi), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(vi).
80. See CAA § 179(b)(1)(B)(vii), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(vii).
81. See id, § 179(b)(1)(B)(viii), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(viii).
82. See id. § 179(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(2).
83. Cf id. § 173(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c)(1) (explaining the use of offsets
for construction of new or modified stationary sources in nonattainment zones).
84. See id. § 179(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(2). Offsets are necessary for con-
struction or modification of major sources in all nonattainment areas regardless
of the status of the state's permit program. See CAA § 173(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7503(c). Each ozone nonattainment area has its own offset requirement de-
pending on its classification under CAA § 181. See id. § 181, 42 U.S.C. § 7511.
For construction permits in marginal ozone nonattainment areas, volatile or-
ganic compound (VOC) pollution offsets of 1.1:1 must be achieved. See id.
§ 182(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(a)(4). Moderate, serious, severe, and extreme
ozone nonattainment areas have VOC offset requirements of at least 1.15:1,
1.2:1, 1.3:1, and 1.5:1, respectively. See id. § 182(b)(5), (c)(10), (d)(2), (e)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(5), (c)(10), (d)(2), (e)(1). A state in a severe or extreme ozone
nonattainment area can reduce the offset burden to 1.2:1 by requiring all major
sources in the nonattainment area to "use best available control technology (as
defined in [42 U.S.C.] § 7479(3))." Id. § 182(d)(2), (e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d)(2),
(e)(1).
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4. Federal-State Interaction Following the EPA
Approval
Once a state has established an approvable operating
permit program, the EPA must suspend the issuance of fed-
eral permits, but continues to retain jurisdiction over federal
permits that have not yet expired.85 The EPA may also re-
tain jurisdiction over permits that have been issued but are
still being either administratively or judicially reviewed.86
Although the approval of partial state permit programs is dis-
couraged,8 7 the EPA may grant interim approval to states
which submit programs that "substantially" meet the re-
quirements of the CAA.88
After a state begins administering a permit program, the
EPA still has oversight authority. Upon finding that a state
is not properly administering or enforcing the program, the
EPA has the discretion to apply the CAA section 179 sanc-
tions described above, but must apply sanctions if inadequate
administration or enforcement continues for more than eight-
een months.8 9 As with the failure to submit an approvable
program, sanctions only apply where inadequate administra-
tion or enforcement relates to a nonattainment area.90 If
state efforts are still inadequate two years after the EPA's
initial finding, the EPA must establish a federal permit
program.9 '
Congress also provided that the EPA Administrator re-
tain oversight authority over the permits themselves. 92
States must submit to the Administrator a copy of each per-
mit application, proposed permit, and issued permit.93 The
Administrator must object within forty five days to a permit
85. See CAA § 502(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(e).
86. See id. § 502(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(e).
87. See id. § 502(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(f).
88. See id. § 502(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(g). Interim approval is effective for
up to two years and is not renewable. See id. See infra note 103 for a discussion
of the status of state submissions of operating permit programs.
89. See id § 502(i)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(i)(1)-(2).
90. See CAA § 502(i)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(i)(3).
91. See id § 502(i)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(i)(4).
92. See id. § 505, 42 U.S.C. § 7661d.
93. See id. § 505(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(a)(1).
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which does not meet the requirements of the CAA or the ap-
plicable SIP.94 If the Administrator objects, the state must
revise the permit to correct the deficiencies. 95 If the state
does not revise the permit accordingly within ninety days, the
Administrator must issue or deny a permit to the applicant. 96
If the Administrator does not object to the permit within the
forty five day period, persons who participated in the public
comment process 97 have sixty days to petition the Adminis-
trator to object to the permit.98 Such a petition will not alter
the effectiveness of a permit that has already been issued by
the state.99 If the Administrator denies the petition, the peti-
tioner may obtain judicial review of this decision under the
judicial review provisions in CAA section 307.100
B. Regulatory Action Implementing Title V Provisions
The EPA published a proposed rule for implementing the
state operating permit programs on May 10, 1991.101 Final
regulations establishing the operating permit program were
published on July 12, 1992.102 The regulations governing the
implementation of state operating permit programs are con-
tained in 40 C.F.R. Part 70.103
94. See id. § 505(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(1).
95. See CAA § 505(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7611d(b)(3).
96. See id. § 505(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(c).
97. See supra text accompanying note 56 for the CAA requirement of an
opportunity for public comment on permit applications.
98. See CAA § 505(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2).
99. See id. § 505(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(d)(2).
100. See id. CAA § 307(b)(1) provides for judicial review of final EPA actions
which are "locally or regionally applicable... in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit." Id. § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
101. Operating Permit Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712 (1991) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
102. See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250 (1992).
103. Appendix A of 40 C.F.R. Part 70 details the status of the state permit
program submission. As of February 18, 1996, the EPA had granted final full
approval for only ten operating permit program submissions. States submitting
fully approvable programs for either the entire state or portions thereof were
Tennessee (Clean Air Act, Final Full Approval of Operating Permits Programs;
Metropolitan Health Dept., Metropolitan Government of Nashville and David-
son County, TN, 61 Fed. Reg. 5705 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70));
Clean Air Act Final Full Approval of Operating Permits Programs; Knox
County, Department of Air Pollution Control, Knox County, Tennessee, 61 Fed.
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Reg. 18,966 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)), Kansas (Final Full Ap-
proval of Operating Permits Programs: State of Kansas, and Delegation of
112(1) Authority, 61 Fed. Reg. 2938 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)),
South Dakota (Clean Air Act Final Full Approval of Operating Permits Pro-
gram State of South Dakota 61 Fed. Reg. 2720 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 70)), Nebraska (Clean Air Act (CAA) Final Full Approval of Operating Per-
mits Program; State of Nebraska, City of Omaha, and Lincoln-Lancaster
County Health Department (LLCHD) and Delegation of 112(1) Authority 60
Fed. Reg. 53,872 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)), Oregon (Clean Air
Act Final Full Approval of Operating Permits Programs in Oregon, 60 Fed. Reg.
50,106 (1995)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)), Louisiana (Clean Air Act Final
Full Approval of Operating Permits Program; Louisiana Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality, 60 Fed. Reg. 47,296 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
70)), Ohio (Clean Air Act Final Full Approval of Operating Permits Program;
Ohio, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,045 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)), South
Carolina (Clean Air Act Final Full Approval of Operating Permits Program;
State of South Carolina, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,913 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 70)), Utah (Clean Air Act Final Full Approval of Operating Permits Pro-
grams; Approval of Construction Permit Program Under Section 112(1); State
of Utah, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,192 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)), and
Mississippi (Clean Air Act Final Full Approval of 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 Operating
Permits Program; State of Mississippi, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,737 (1994) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)). Final interim approval was granted in over 48 states or
air quality control regions. See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 70 App. A for a listing of approvals
and disapprovals broken down by state. The EPA will be reviewing more than
50 submissions since several states, such as California, have more than one air
pollution control region and submit operating permit programs for each region.
See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 70 App. A. In addition, territories of the United States, such
as Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands, are regulated under the
CAA. See CAA § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(d) (defining the term "State" to in-
clude "a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam.... American Samoa and.., the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands"). In fact, the District of Columbia received final in-
terim approval of its operating permit program on August 7, 1995. Title V
Clean Air Act Final Interim Approval of Operating Permits Program; District of
Columbia, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,101 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
As of August 24, 1996, Virginia was the only state to have had an operating
permit program finally disapproved. However, Virginia is not the only state
whose standing statute needs revision. On October 30, 1995, the EPA proposed
interim approval for Maryland's operating permit program but noted that the
state's standing statute had to be amended before full approval could be
granted. Clean Air Act Proposed Interim Approval of Operating Permits Pro-
gram; State of Maryland, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,231, 55,233 (1995) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 70). The EPA determined that Maryland's standing statute provides
sufficient opportunity for judicial review to state residents. See id. The EPA
was concerned, however, that under current law out-of-state individuals and
corporations not doing business in Maryland have to demonstrate "a specific
interest or property righf' that will be harmed in a way that is different from
the general public. See id. While Maryland grants the equivalent of Article III
17
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In the preamble to the final regulations, the EPA noted
several important aspects of the CAA operating permit pro-
gram. First, the EPA acknowledged that creating a CAA per-
mit program brings the CAA up to speed with other
comprehensive permit-based environmental statutes.104 Sec-
ond, one of the goals of enacting the regulations was to "mini-
mize the disruption to current State efforts by offering as
much flexibility as is provided by the law."'0 5 Third, the per-
mit program was designed to reduce confusion by state offi-
cials and the regulated public and improve enforcement
efforts by including all relevant requirements into a single
document.10 6
The regulation covering standing to seek judicial review
of a final permit action is contained in 40 C.F.R. section
70.4(b)(3)(x). This section provides that when a state submits
a proposed operating permit program for approval by the
EPA, the submission must contain, inter alia, a legal opinion
that the state has adequate authority to:
[p]rovide an opportunity for judicial review in State court
of the final permit action by the applicant, any person who
participated in the public participation process provided
pursuant to section 70.7(h) of [40 C.F.R. Part 701, and any
other person who could obtain judicial review of such ac-
tions under State laws. 0 7
standing (See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of Article I
standing) to state residents and corporations doing business in the state, such
standing is not granted to out-of-state individuals or corporations not doing
business in the state. See id. Virginia's statute, on the other hand, does not
even grant Article III standing to its own residents. See e.g. Clean Air Act
Final Disapproval of Operating Permits Program; Commonwealth of Virginia,
59 Fed. Reg. 62,324, 62,325 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
104. See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,251 (1992). Two other major environmental
statutes which utilize a permit program are the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1984 & Supp. V 1993)) and the Clean
Water Act (CWA § 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387). Unlike the CAA, however,
neither of these statutes set out any specific incentives for states to develop
their own permit programs.
105. 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,251 (1992).
106. See id.
107. 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(3)(x) (1994). The corresponding statutory authority
states that an opportunity for judicial review should be provided to "the appli-
cant, any person who participated in the public comment process, and any other
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/19
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The regulations imposed several other limits on the op-
portunity for judicial review of final permit actions. First,
when an approved permit program is in place, judicial review
of a final permit action by the permitting authority may only
be obtained in State court by means of a petition filed within
ninety days of the final action.'0 8 States may provide for a
shorter time.' 0 9 Second, the terms of the permit are not sub-
ject to review in any state or federal enforcement action." 0
In the preamble to the final regulations, the EPA explained
that these limitations were necessary to provide "greater cer-
tainty for sources and State and Federal enforcement person-
nel as to what requirements under the Act apply to a
particular source.""'
C. The EPA regulatory action on Virginia's operating
permit program
Virginia submitted its proposed operating permit pro-
gram and certification of legal sufficiency on November 12,
1993.112 After reviewing Virginia's information, the EPA pro-
posed to disapprove the permit program on June 17, 1994.113
Several reasons were listed as justification of the EPA's dis-
approval. Specifically, the EPA noted that Virginia's judicial
review statute" 4 failed to provide for judicial review of state
permit actions to all categories of interested persons specified
in the CAA.11 While regulatory provisions require that judi-
person who could obtain judicial review of that action under applicable law."
CAA § 502(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6). The regulation uses the word "state"
instead of the word "applicable" because the EPA has interpreted "applicable
law" to mean "state law.' See Brief of Respondent, at 20 n.9, Virginia v.
Browner, 80 F.rd 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (no. 95-1052) (Virginia II).
108. See 40 O.F.R. § 70.4(b)(3)(xii) (1994). Petitions submitted after the
deadline will be granted only if grounds for review arise following the expira-
tion of the 90 day deadline. I&
109. See i&
110. See id.
111. 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,265-66 (1992).
112. See Clean Air Act Disapproval of Operating Permits Program; Common-
wealth of Virginia, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,183 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
113. See id.
114. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318(B) (Michie 1993).
115. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,183, 31,184 (1994).
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cial review be afforded to "any person who participated in the
public comment process... and any other person who could
obtain judicial review of such actions under State laws,"" 6
Virginia's statute further limits judicial review to only those
persons who demonstrated an immediate, pecuniary harm. 1 7
Virginia's judicial review statute specifically states:
The person invoking jurisdiction under this subsection
bears the burden of establishing that (i) such person has
suffered an actual, threatened, or imminent injury; (ii)
such an injury is an invasion of an immediate, legally pro-
tected, pecuniary and substantial interest which is con-
crete and particularized; (iii) such injury is fairly traceable
to the decision of the [Air Pollution Control] Board... and
(iv) such injury will likely be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion by the court." s
Several other reasons not within the scope of this Com-
ment were also given by the EPA.L9
On December 5, 1994, following an extended comment
period,120 the EPA published its final disapproval of Vir-
ginia's operating permit program.121 In its final disapproval,
EPA addressed the comments related to the judicial review
116. 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(3)(x) (1994). See supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
117. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,183, 31,184 (1994). To obtain judicial review in fed-
eral court, the injury need not be monetary in nature; environment-based inju-
ries are sufficient. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137
(1992). See supra note 8 for a discussion of standing to sue in federal court.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318(B) (Michie 1993) (emphasis added).
119. The EPA noted that some of Virginia's key regulations had expired and
not been renewed. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,183 (1994). The disapproval was also
based on the EPA's determination that "the regulatory portion of the program
does not include the proper universe of sources required to be subject to a state
operating permit program or ensure that permits contain all applicable require-
ments, or correctly delineating provisions enforceable only in Virginia." Id.
120. At the request of counsel for amicus National Independent Energy Pro-
ducers and Ogden Martin Systems, the EPA extended the deadline for com-
ments on the proposed disapproval of Virginia's permit program from July 18,
1994 to August 17, 1994. See Clean Air Act Disapproval of Operating Permits
Program; Commonwealth of Virginia-Extension of Comment Period, 59 Fed.
Reg. 41,265 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
121. See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324 (1994).
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provisions. Specifically, the EPA responded to the assertion
that Virginia's judicial review statute met the requirements
of CAA section 502(b)(6).122
In response, the EPA pointed out, that under Virginia
law, a person who participated in the public comment process
and otherwise met the requirements of Article III prudential
standing 123 could nevertheless be precluded from judicial re-
view of the granting (or denial) of a permit since Virginia's
requirements for standing are stricter than traditional Arti-
cle III prudential standing limitations.2 4 The EPA also re-
sponded to a comment which suggested that CAA section
502(b)(6) might violate the Tenth Amendment. 25 The EPA
cited both Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn, Inc. 2 6 and New York v. United States 27 in concluding
that, through cooperative federalism, a federal agency can
use incentives or federal preemption as a means of encourag-
ing states to regulate in the manner suggested by
Congress.128
Following the filing of Virginia's district court complaint
and Fourth Circuit petition for judicial review, Virginia sub-
122. 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324, 62,325 (1994).
123. See supra note 8 for a discussion of Article M and prudential standing.
124. See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324, 62,325-26 (1994).
125. See id. at 62,326.
126. 452 U.S. 264 (1982). InHodel, the Supreme Court addressed, inter alia,
a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining and Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977. See id. at 268. The statute at issue had a regulatory permit
program quite similar to that of the CAA except the only incentive for states to
develop their own surface mining permit programs was the avoidance of federal
preemption. See id. at 288. In overturning a district court finding that the fed-
eral regulation of surface mining violated the Tenth Amendment because regu-
lating land use was a traditional state function, the Supreme Court declared
that Congress was permissibly regulating private businesses and not the State
as a state. See id. at 293. The Court also determined that since Congress
clearly was permitted to preempt state regulation in the field of surface mining,
it was not a violation of the Tenth Amendment for Congress to use the threat of
preemption as an incentive for the states to regulate themselves according to
the federal program. See id. at 290-91.
127. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See infra section II.D.1 of this Comment for an
extensive discussion of New York v. United States.
128. See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324, 62,326 (1994).
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mitted a revised operating permit program.129 The EPA pro-
posed to disapprove of Virginia's second program submission
on September 19, 1995.130 Again, the EPA cited deficiencies
in Virginia's judicial review statute in light of the fact that
Virginia had not amended its standing law.13 1 The EPA re-
fused to consider even interim approval of Virginia's plan
stating that:
[i]f Virginia is permitted to narrowly preclude public com-
menters from exercising judicial review rights, one of the
chief incentives for permit decision makers to fully con-
sider public comments would be significantly reduced and
the public comments process would thereby be rendered
less meaningful.' 32
D. Constitutional Background
1. The Tenth Amendment as Interpreted in New York
v. United States133
The Supreme Court faced a problem similar to the one at
issue between Virginia and the EPA in New York v. United
States. In New York, the State of New York and the counties
of Allegheny and Cortland (petitioners) challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act (LLRWPAA).'34 Petitioners' challenge was
129. See Clean Air Act Proposed Disapproval of Operating Permits Program;
Commonwealth of Virginia, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,435, 48,436 (1995) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
130. See 60 Fed. Reg. 48,435.
131. See id. at 48,436.
132. Id.
133. 112 S. Ct. 2408.
134. See id. at 2414. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act(LLRWPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b to 2021j (1988 & Supp. V 1993), was originally
enacted in 1980. Pub. L. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980). The LLRWPA was to
make each state "responsible for providing for the availability of capacity ... for
the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders."
LLRWPA § 4(a)(1)(A), 94 Stat. 3347, 3348. In furtherance of this policy, the
states were authorized to enter into regional compacts with other states "to pro-
vide for the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low-
level radioactive waste." Id. § 4(a)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 3347, 3348. However, there
were no incentives for the states to enter into such compacts nor any penalties
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based on the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee
Clause 35of the United States Constitution.13 6
a. State Responsibilities Under the LLRWPAA
To meet the requirements of the LLRWPAA, states were
to enact legislation to secure disposal of its low-level radioac-
tive waste.13 7 States or regional compacts that did not have
disposal facilities within their own borders were given incen-
tives to develop sites of their own. First, the state in which a
disposal facility is located could exact a surcharge on the dis-
posal of waste from outside their state or compact region. 138
A portion of the surcharges were to be placed in an escrow
account, to be held by the Secretary of Energy, and paid back
to the states which reached the indicated legislative or ad-
ministrative milestones set out in the LLRWPAA.' s9 The sec-
ond incentive for states to develop disposal plans involved the
use of disposal site access restrictions. 140 States failing to
meet the statutory milestones were charged additional
for failure to do so. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2415. To
give the initial act more teeth, Congress enacted the amendments at issue in
New York. See id
135. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Under the Guarantee Clause, "[tihe United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Gov-
ernment .... ." Id. The Court held that those provisions of the LLRWPAA
which did not offend the Tenth Amendment also did not violate the Guarantee
Clause.
136. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2433.
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1) (1988). The LLRWPAA sets out four statu-
tory deadlines. By 1986, states were to "ratify compact legislation or, by the
enactment of legislation or the certification of the Governor, indicate its intent
to develop a site for the location of a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility
within such State." 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1). By 1988, compact regions not con-
taining a disposal site were to identify a location for such a facility and states
which were not members of compacts were to develop a siting plan. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021e(e)(1)(B). Applications for licenses to operate disposal facilities were due
by January 1, 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(C)(i). In the alternative, states
were to certify that they had a waste disposal plan which would take effect by
December 31, 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 202le(e)(1)(C)(ii). Finally, by January 1, 1992,
applications for licensing of disposal facilities for all states and non-sited com-
pact regiong were to be filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(D).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) (1988).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2) (1988). See supra note 118 for a description
of the goals to be met by each state or compact.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(2) (1988).
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surcharges and could have all access to disposal facilities de-
nied to them.141 Finally, states that did not provide for dispo-
sal of their waste by January 1, 1996 would have been
required to take title to and possession of the waste and be
liable for damages incurred due to the state's failure to take
possession of the waste. 142
b. Relevant Constitutional Provisions Discussed
by the Court
In analyzing the Tenth Amendment issue, the Court
noted that the relevant questions were (1) "whether an Act of
Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Con-
gress in Article I of the Constitution," or (2) "whether an Act
of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty re-
served by the Tenth Amendment."143 The Court explained
that under the LLRWPAA, where there was a "division of au-
thority between federal and state governments, the two in-
quiries are mirror images of each other.""' Thus, if Congress
was granted an express power in the Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment could not be used to show that power was re-
served to the states.145 Likewise, "if a power is an attribute
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress."146
The Court concluded that the statute must be examined
to determine whether "an incident of state sovereignty is pro-
tected by a limitation on an Article I power.""47 In terms of
the balance of power between the federal and state govern-
ments, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause gives the
federal government a broad range of powers and that the
Supremacy Clause 48 helps tip the balance of power in favor
141. See id.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988).
143. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2418.
148. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the
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of the federal government.1 49 However, the Court noted that
petitioners were not arguing that the United States could
not, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, directly regulate the
disposal of radioactive waste.' 50 Instead, the petitioners
were asserting that Congress could not require states to regu-
late in a specific manner.' 5 '
In addressing the claims put forth by the petitioners, the
Court offered a brief history of federalism under the Articles
of Confederation and the Constitution.152 Under the Articles
of Confederation, Congress was to regulate only the states
and not the people directly. 53 During the Constitutional
Convention, the framers considered two governmental
plans. 5 4 The first plan was known as the "Virginia Plan"
which would give Congress the power to regulate individuals
directly and the second was the "New Jersey Plan" which
would follow the procedure in place under the Articles of Con-
federation.' 55 The Virginia Plan was the one ultimately
adopted by the framers. 56
The Court then turned to a discussion of the methods
available to Congress to urge states to enact specific legisla-
tion. The Court noted that there were "a variety of methods"
available but chose to discuss only the Spending power and
the doctrine of preemption. 157 With regard to the Spending
power, the Court determined that Congress may use the re-
ceipt of federal funding as a way to "influence a State's legis-
lative choices" provided certain requirements were met.158
Congress may also give the states the option of passing legis-
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.
149. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2419.
150. See id. at 2420.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 2421-22.
153. See id. at 2421.
154. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2422.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 2422.
157. See id. at 2423-24.
158. See id. 2423. The requirements for the conditioning of federal funding
were set out by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
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lation that meets federal standards or having the federal gov-
ernment preempt state legislation with federal law.159
Again, however, the Court noted that other methods were
available even though the Court chose not to discuss them.160
The Court concluded that the ultimate choice should be
left to the citizens of each state. Under the two methods dis-
cussed, for instance, the states would decide which is more
important. 161 The Court proposed that when Congress uses
its Spending power, the citizens could decide that the federal
funding is not worth giving up their authority to address local
interests when such interests are inconsistent with federal
policy.' 62 Likewise, when Congress uses preemption, the
states may decide that federal law does not go far enough and
opt to accept the minimum federal requirements in exchange
for the power to enact stricter regulations. 163
The Court reasoned that if Congress attempts to force
states to enact legislation rather than providing choices, both
the United States and the states themselves are not properly
held accountable to the citizens. 6 4 To explain, the Court
stated that citizens put into office those people who will fur-
ther their interests. 165 If states are forced to regulate accord-
ing to Congress' wishes, the Court was concerned that the
people might blame their state government for failing to
carry out the proper policies while the federal government
was shielded from displeasure of the people of the affected
state.166 According to the majority, this would not happen if
(1987). See infra section II.D.2 of this Comment for a discussion of South Da-
kota v. Dole.
159. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
160. See id. (stating that "[b]y either of these two methods, as by any other
permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices,
the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the
State will comply") (emphasis added).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2424.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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the federal government directly legislated on the particular
issue.167
c. Application of the Analysis to the LLRWPAA
The Court turned its attention to the statute at issue.
Before applying the analysis, the Court recognized that the
petitioners and the federal government interpreted the
LLRWPAA in two different ways.168 The petitioners pointed
to the phrase "[e]ach State shall be responsible for providing
... for the disposal of... low-level radioactive waste..." and
determined that this was a direct mandate.'6 9 The United
States, however, took the LLRWPAA as a whole and argued
that it was really a set of incentives. 70 The Court, acknowl-
edging the acceptability of both constructions, adopted the
latter.171 The two reasons given for this decision were (1) to
avoid 'upset[ing] the usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers'" 172 and (2) adopting the incentive construc-
tion would allow the Court to adhere to a canon of statutory
construction requiring them to construe a statute in such a
way as to avoid "serious constitutional problems."173
Following this discussion, the Court addressed the
surcharge provisions of the LLRWPAA.174 These provisions
involved the authorization of the surcharges, the placing of
the money in an escrow account, and the repayment to the
states upon reaching the statutory milestones. 175 The Court
quickly dispensed with these provisions noting that they
were permissible exercises of Congress' powers to "authorize
the states to burden interstate commerce", enact a tax on in-
167. See id.
168. See id. at 2425.
169. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct at 2425 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021c(a)(1)(A)).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1991)).
173. Id.
174. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-27.
175. See id.
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terstate commerce, and condition federal spending,
respectively. 176
The second set of incentives addressed by the Court was
the access provisions. 177 Under these provisions, the Court
held that Congress was permissibly exercising its power to
allow states to discriminate against interstate commerce. 178
The Court held that Congress could give sited states the
power to refuse to accept out-of-state or out-of-compact
waste.179
The third set of incentive provisions, the "take title" op-
tion, was the one that caused the Court trouble. In declaring
this "option" to be invalid, the Court concluded that there was
no independent constitutional provision allowing Congress to
force states to take title to radioactive waste.180 Further-
more, the majority noted that the only way to avoid taking
title to the waste was to enact legislation in the manner spec-
ified and within the schedule set out in the statute.'"' Since
these two options, standing alone, would be unconstitutional,
the Court held that offering them in the alternative was un-
constitutional as well.28 2 The Court later noted that, even if
state officials had agreed to the conditions set out in the lan-
guage of the statute, the constitutional problem was not
eliminated. 83
d. The Guarantee Clause 8 4 and the Issue of
Severability
At the end of its opinion, the majority addressed the peti-
tioners' Guarantee Clause claims.'8 5 In construing the Guar-
176. See id. at 2425-26.
177. See id. at 2427.
178. See id.
179. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2427.
180. See id. at 2428 (noting that "the take title incentive does not represent
the conditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in the
Constitution").
181. See id.
182. See id. at 2428.
183. See id. at 2431-32.
184. See supra note 135 for the text of the Guarantee Clause.
185. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2432-33.
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antee Clause, the Court indicated that this portion of the
Constitution was applicable when states are forced to forfeit
control over their legislative agendas. 186 Since the Court had
already dispensed with the take title provisions of the
LLRWPAA, the Court only considered the first two sets of in-
centives. These provisions, concluded the majority, "do not
pose any realistic risk of altering the form or the method of
fimctioning of New York's government."18 7 They merely had
the result of denying New York its share of federal funding or
denying access to out-of-state disposal sites.'88
The last issue addressed by the Court was the severabil-
ity of the offensive "take title" provisions. 89 The Court con-
cluded that since Congress did not address the issue of
severability, there was no presumption against severabil-
ity.' 90 According to the majority, the rest of the statute
served a legitimate congressional purpose and operated to en-
courage the states to adopt Congress's plan.19 ' Finally, the
Court stated that the fact that a state may "encounter consid-
erable internal pressure" to deal with radioactive waste did
not render the statute entirely invalid. 92
2. The Spending Power and Its Limitations - South
Dakota v. Dole' 93
As noted by the majority in New York v. United States,194
a challenge to Congress' use of federal funding as an incen-
tive for states to regulate according to a national plan must
pass the test set out by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v.
Dole.'95 In Dole, the State of South Dakota questioned the
power of Congress to condition the receipt of federal highway
funds on the enactment of state legislation raising the mini-
186. See id. at 2433.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 2434.
190. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2434.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. 483 U.S. 203.
194. 112 S. Ct. 2408.
195. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2423.
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mum drinking age to twenty-one. 196 The state cited both the
Spending Clause 197 and the Twenty-first Amendment' 98 to
the Constitution in support of its claims. 199
In ruling that Congress's actions were constitutional, the
Court declined to hold that the federal statute withholding
five percent of federal highway funds from those states refus-
ing to raise their drinking ages offended the Twenty-first
Amendment. 20 0 Instead, the Court stated that if Congress's
actions were consistent with the Spending Clause then the
statute was constitutional regardless of whether the Twenty-
first Amendment allowed federal regulation of the drinking
age.20 '
The Court examined the relevant precedent and con-
cluded that case law had established four limitations on the
congressional spending power.20 2 First, Congress may only
spend "in pursuit of 'the general welfare.' 203 However, the
Court noted that Congress's judgment as to whether this re-
quirement is met should be accorded great deference.204 Sec-
ond, Congress must make its intentions clear so that states
may make an informed choice.205 Third, "conditions on fed-
eral grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the
federal interest in particular national projects or pro-
grams." 20 6 In a footnote, the Court recognized that it had no
guidance as to whether the relationship must be direct or in-
196. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203. South Dakota had enacted a
law allowing persons who were at least nineteen to purchase beer that con-
tained no more than 3.2% alcohol. See id.
197. See supra note 7 for the text of the Spending Clause.
198. The relevant portion of the Amendment reads: '"he transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
199. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 206.
202. See id. at 207.
203. See id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
204. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
205. See id.
206. See id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
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direct, but concluded that the drinking age and safe highways
were directly related anyway.20 7 Fourth, the Court noted
that there can be no other independent constitutional bar to
Congress's conditions.208
In discussing the Tenth Amendment in relation to fed-
eral spending, the Court referred to Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Commission.20 9 In U.S. Civil Service
Commission, the Supreme Court held that it was constitu-
tional for the federal government to withhold certain federal
funds if a state refused to remove one of its officials even
though directly ordering the removal would be an invasion of
the state's sovereignty.210 The U.S. Civil Service Commission
Court specifically determined that the Tenth Amendment
could not be used to overturn Congress's decision to withhold
federal funds.211 Neither the petitioners nor the Court raised
the question of whether the Spending Clause prohibited the
withholding of funds in this case.
The Dole Court quickly determined that Congress' condi-
tions on the federal highway funds met the first three re-
quirements, specifically noting that "one of the main
purposes for which highway funds are expended" is public
safety.212 Turning to the fourth requirement, the Court, rely-
ing on cases such as Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Commission, decided that the statute at issue in Dole was not
limited by the Twenty-first Amendment.21 3 There would be
an independent constitutional bar if Congress was using the
funds to encourage the states to act unconstitutionally them-
selves.21 4 Finally, the Court recognized that Congress is ca-
pable of structuring legislation such that states are not
207. See id. at 208 n.3.
208. See 1d. at 208.
209. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
210. See id. at 143.
211. See id.
212. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
213. See id. at 210 (noting that "the independent constitutional bar' limita-
tion on the spending power is not, as petitioner suggests, a prohibition on the
indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve
directly").
214. See id. at 210-11.
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encouraged, but forced, to act; however, the Court cautioned
against confusing the concepts of temptation and coercion. 215
III. The Courts Decide the Constitutional Issues
A. Constitutional Issues Raised by the Parties and Amici
in the Judicial Review Action Brought by the
Commonwealth of Virginia
1. Virginia's Arguments
Virginia made two constitutional arguments in its brief.
First, Virginia claimed that the judicial review provisions of
CAA section 502(b)(6)21r violate the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.217 Virginia argued that Con-
gress is effectively forcing the states to amend their jurisdic-
tional statutes in violation of state sovereignty. 218 First,
Virginia maintained that the state court system is one of the
cornerstones of state sovereignty and sovereign immunity.2 19
Virginia asserted that since the Tenth Amendment, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States,220
forbids Congress from forcing states to legislate, the judicial
review provisions of the CAA are unconstitutional. 221 Vir-
ginia then argued that Congress has offended the principles
of federalism because states no longer can legislate as they
wish and state legislators risk being booted out of office while
the federal government escapes unscathed. 222
The second constitutional attack on the CAA concerned
the use of highway sanctions to encourage states to submit
approvable permit programs. Virginia noted that the judicial
215. See id. at 211.
216. CWA § 502(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6).
217. See brief of Petitioner at 24, Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir.
1996) (Virginia III) (No. 95-1052) [hereinafter brief of Petitioner].
218. See id. at 25.
219. See id. at 26.
220. 112 S. Ct. 2408. See section fl.D.1 of this Comment for an extensive
discussion of New York v. United States.
221. See brief of Petitioner, supra note 217, at 26-29.
222. See id at 29-30.
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review provisions should be struck down because the sanction
method used in the CAA has not been judicially approved.223
Virginia suggested that courts have permitted Congress
to encourage state participation in two major ways. First,
Virginia stated that Congress may allow states to choose be-
tween adopting the federally sanctioned method of legislation
or having state law preempted.224 Second, Congress can use
federal funding as a means of encouraging state coopera-
tion.225 Virginia claimed that the first of these two methods
was improperly used in this situation because the CAA "does
not establish a preemption arrangement . . . [since]
[plarticipation by the States is mandatory."226 Virginia also
noted that an EPA-established federal permit program is
designed to be used only until the state submits an approva-
ble program.2 27 According to Virginia, the second method is
not properly used since the use of federal fumds as an incen-
tive to states must be "directly and reasonably related to the
purpose of highway spending: safe interstate travel."22s Vir-
ginia concluded that since courts have not suggested that a
combination of the two methods is permissible, this type of
incentive is unconstitutional.2 29
2. The EPA's Reply to Virginia's Constitutional
Arguments
The EPA maintained that the CAA provisions challenged
by Virginia were consistent with the Constitution as written
and interpreted. The EPA argued that, in seeking to remedy
the states' past failure to combat air pollution, the Amend-
ments established a series of incentives to encourage state
participation, namely the withholding of certain Title 23
highway funds and the imposition of 2:1 offsets in nonattain-
223. See id. at 30-33.
224. See i. at 31.
225. See id.
226. See brief of Petitioner, supra note 217, at 31.
227. See id-
228. Id. at 33 (citing the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203). See supra section ll.D.2 of this Comment for an analysis of South Dakota
v. Dole.
229. See brief of Petitioner, supra note 217, at 33.
1996] 355
33
356 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
ment areas.230 In fact, the EPA claimed, the decision in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Train,23 ' which acknowledged this
method, was noted in the legislative history to the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments as support for the use of sanctions to
encourage state action.23 2 The EPA also noted that Virginia
was confused as to its position. In its brief, Virginia took the
inconsistent positions that states are directly commanded to
enact the "offensive" legislation and that Congress has estab-
lished a series of incentives, albeit strong ones.233
In refuting the claims advanced by Virginia, the EPA
first noted that the court was obligated to avoid any constitu-
tional problems by construing the statute as employing incen-
tives rather than directly mandating state legislation. 234 The
EPA then countered Virginia's interpretation of New York v.
United States235 and claimed that Congress has simply
presented states with a constitutional alternative to legislat-
ing as described in CAA section 502(b). 236 The EPA noted
that Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper
230. See brief of Respondent at 35, Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir.
1996) (Virginia III) (95-1052)[hereinafter brief of Respondent].
231. 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). In
District of Columbia v. Train, the D.C. Circuit addressed the responsibilities of
states under federal environmental regulatory programs. The court rejected an
attempt by the EPA to force states to enact legislation regulating sources of air
pollution. See id. at 986. The court also held that the states could not be forced
to administer a regulatory program promulgated by a federal agency. See id. at
992. Although the court refused to allow the federal government to directly
meddle in state lawmaking, it acknowledged that Congress had not provided
any incentive for the states to enact or administer an acceptable regulatory
plan. See id. In a footnote, the court recognized the practice of using federal
funding as a means of coaxing reluctant states into voluntarily implementing
federally-sanctioned regulatory programs. 521 F.2d at 992-93 n.26.
232. See brief of Respondent, supra note 230, at 35-36 n.22.
233. See id. at 36.
234. See brief of Respondent, supra note 230, at 37-38.
235. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text for Virginia's interpreta-
tion of New York v. United States.
236. See id. at 41.
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Clause 23 7 to use the Commerce and Spending Clauses to en-
courage states to enact air pollution control legislation.238
The EPA claims that Virginia is trying to force courts
into a "slippery concept" analysis of the difference between
"effective coercion" and "indirect compulsion." 23 9 Virginia's
professions of adverse "local economic impacts" are not
enough to support a finding of unconstitutionality, main-
tained the EPA.240 The EPA countered that if Virginia is un-
happy with the requirements of the CAA, it can seek to
amend the legislation.241
The EPA supported the use of federal highway fund limi-
tations and increased offsets in nonattainment areas. 242 The
use of highway funds in the CAA passes constitutional mus-
ter under the Supreme Court's reasoning in New York v.
United States according to the EPA.243 Since the withholding
of Title 23 federal highway funds reasonably relates to the
goal of cleaner air,2 " federal highway funding and the goals
of the CAA go hand in hand, maintained the EPA.24 5 In addi-
tion, the EPA noted that the offset provisions operate directly
on the sources, not on the states.2 46 Therefore, the EPA ar-
237. Congress has the power "[tio make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing (enumerated] Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
238. See brief of Respondent, supra note 230, at 42-43.
239. See id. at 43.
240. See id. at 44 (citing the Supreme Court holding in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1982)).
241. See id. at 45-46 (citing the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
242. See brief of Respondent, supra note 230, at 46-55.
243. See id. at 47.
244. See id. at 48. The EPA notes specifically that only projects that would
tend to increase use of motor vehicles and exasperate the problem of air pollu-
tion are subject to withholding of funds. Any projects that are safety related or
result in a decrease in air pollution will continue to be funded regardless of the
use of CAA § 179. See id. at 49.
245. See brief of Respondent, supra note 230, at 51.
246. See id. at 42. The offset sanctions actually operate directly on the
sources in a rather indirect manner. Although CAA § 179(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7509(b)(2), states simply that "the ratio of emissions shall be at least 2 to 1,"
the EPA's own regulations impose this sanction in a different manner. See 40
C.F.R. § 52.31(e)(1)(i) (1995). The language in the regulation provides that
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gued that the offset provisions are a constitutional exercise of
Congress' Commerce powers. 247
3. Constitutional Arguments of Amici
a. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation (CBF), a non-profit en-
vironmental organization, filed an amicus curiae brief sup-
porting the respondent EPA.248 The CBF first noted that,
since the requirements of CAA section 502(b) can have multi-
ple interpretations, the court is obligated to presume consti-
tutionality and adopt the interpretation that would avoid the
constitutional problem.2 4 9 The crux of the CBF's Tenth
Amendment argument was that the judicial review provi-
sions are constitutional because they were enacted pursuant
to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and do not
mandate state action in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.250 The CBF declined to read the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in New York v. United States251 as voiding the relevant
"[tihe State shall apply the emission offset requirements ... at a ratio of at least
two units of emission reductions for each unit of increased emissions ... ." Id.
However, if the State refuses to enforce the new offset requirements, under
CAA § 505, the EPA must disapprove any permit which does not meet the re-
quirements of the CAA and issue the permit itself. See CAA § 505(b)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(1); see also supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the EPA's role in the granting of permits.
247. See id.
248. The CBF claims that about 20,000 of its members live in the state of
Virginia. See brief of amicus curiae Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. at 1, Vir-
ginia v. Browner (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1052) [hereinafter Brief of CBFI. The
CBF has an interest in the outcome of the case in question since air quality in
Virginia will directly affect the quality of the water in the Chesapeake Bay. See
id. at 2.
249. See brief of CBF, supra note 248, at 5, 10-11. CBF noted in its summary
of the argument, though not in the body of the argument itself, that CAA lan-
guage that the states "shall" submit approvable Title V programs can be inter-
preted as either a direct mandate or as a use of incentives. Thus, the court is
bound by canons of statutory construction to adopt the latter interpretation.
See id. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
issue by the Court in New York v. United States.
250. See brief of CBF, supra note 248, at 13-14.
251. See supra section 11.D.1 of this Comment for a discussion of New York v.
United States.
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/19
BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR
provisions in the CAA as unconstitutional. 252 Even if Con-
gress was trying to force the states to legislate, the CBF ar-
gued that there are no enforcement provisions in the CAA
that the EPA could use against a state.253 In its brief, the
CBF concluded that the states are offered a real choice in the
matter of operating permit programs and that the methods
employed by Congress do not infringe upon state
sovereignty. 254
In analyzing the sanction provisions in light of the
Spending Clause, the CBF determined that the test set out by
the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole25 5 is met by the
language of the CAA.256 The CBF recognized that Virginia's
main argument is that the use of highway fund sanctions do
not relate to air pollution,257 but cited several ways that the
two do relate, particularly that the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),258 which is
codified partially in Title 23, states that the national policy is
to create an environmentally sound transportation system.259
The CBF also argued that if the court finds any of the sanc-
tions to be unconstitutional, the offensive section should sim-
252. See brief of CBF, supra note 248, at 15-19.
253. See id. at 20. The CBF demonstrated that the CAA's enforcement sec-
tion (CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. 7413) can only be used against a pollution source
and not a regulating authority. See id. at 21. Case law and legislative history
of CAA § 113 are used to bolster the CBF's interpretation of CAA enforcement
options. See brief of CBF, supra note 248, at 21-22.
254. See id. at 22-28.
255. See supra section Il.D.2 of this Comment for discussion of South Dakota
v. Dole.
256. See brief of CBF, supra note 248, at 31-32.
257. See id. at 28.
258. 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
259. See brief of CBF, supra note 248, at 29. The CBF and the EPA both fail
to mention the fact that ISTEA was not the first time the CAA and highway
funding were linked together by Congress. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1970 specifically stated that "[t]he Secretary [of Transportation], after consulta-
tion with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall de-
velop and promulgate guidelines to assure that highways constructed pursuant
to this title are consistent with any approved plan for the implementation of
any ambient air quality standard for any air quality control region designated
pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended." Federal Highway-Aid Act of 1970,
Pub. L. 91-605, § 136(b), 84 Stat. 1713, 1735 (codified as amended in various
sections of Title 23).
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ply be discarded with the remaining portions of the CAA
remaining in effect. 260
b. Washington Legal Foundation
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), a non-profit
organization involved in public interest law issues, submitted
a brief in support of Virginia.261 The WLF is involved in is-
sues dealing with state sovereignty and advocates against ex-
cessive environmental regulations by the federal
government. 262 The WLF's position was that the EPA's inter-
pretation of the judicial review provisions under CAA section
502(b)(6) should be rejected in order to avoid an unnecessary
analysis of constitutional claims.263 The WLF echoed Vir-
ginia's argument that the use of sanctions does not fit neatly
into any of the Congressional incentive options discussed in
New York v. United States.264
c. Virginia Manufacturers Association
The Virginia Manufacturers Association (VMA) is an or-
ganization comprised of Virginia businesses, many of whom
fall under the CAA's definition of "major source" and, there-
fore, would be required to obtain Title V permits.2 65 The
VMA participated in the creation of Virginia's judicial review
statute and commented on the EPA's proposal to disapprove
of Virginia's operating permit program. 266 The VMA claimed
that the EPA's decision to disapprove Virginia's submission
places its members in operational limbo, unable to expand or
260. See brief of CBF, supra note 248, at 33.
261. See brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 2, Virginia v. Browner (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1052) [here-
inafter Brief of WLF].
262. See id
263. See id. at 10. Virginia has challenged both the EPA's interpretation of
CAA § 502(b)(6) and the constitutionality of that section. See generally, Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 217. By finding the EPA's interpretation to be arbitrary
and capricious, the Fourth Circuit could avoid the constitutional issues
altogether.
264. See brief of WLF, supra note 261, at 11.
265. See brief of Amicus Curiae Virginia Manufacturers Association at 1,
Virginia v. Browner (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1052) [hereinafter Brief of VMA].
266. See id. at 1.
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modify its facilities and facing the possibility of unreasonable
permit fees.267
The VMA challenged the constitutionality of the judicial
review requirements of the operating permit program using
arguments similar to those employed by Virginia. First, the
VMA asserted that Congress is unconstitutionally compelling
states to enact federal standards. 268 According to the VMA,
both the offsets and limitations on highway funding are im-
permissible coercion rather than incentives.26 9 The VMA ar-
gued that offset sanctions would severely hinder Virginia
businesses' chances of competing with out-of-state facilities
and discourage other businesses from coming to the state.270
The VMA also maintained that highway sanctions would hold
nearly 100 percent of federal highway funding hostage until
Virginia submits an approvable program. 271 The second con-
stitutional point in the VMA's brief is that, as argued by Vir-
ginia, federal highway funds "are not rationally related to the
purposes of the CAA."272
d. National Independent Energy Producers and
Ogden Martin Systems2 73
The National Independent Energy Producers (NIEP) and
Ogden Martin Systems (OMS) are engaged in the business of
267. See id. at 2-3. One of the reasons the EPA gave for proposing to disap-
prove Virginia's operating permit program was the failure of the plan to provide
for adequate permit fees to sustain the program. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,183 (1994).
Virginia's code and rules provide for collection of permit fees of up to $25 per
ton of pollutant. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1322.1 and Rule 8-6 (Michie 1993).
The CAA, on the other hand, requires that state permit fees should not be less
than $25 per ton. See CAA § 502(b)(3)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(3)(B)(i). The
EPA claimed that Virginia's fee schedule, while adequate to cover the direct
costs of implementing the permit program, did not provide enough funds to
cover any indirect costs of running the program. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,183, 31,185
(1994). Therefore, The EPA determined that the requirements of 40 C.F.R.
70.9(b) were not met. See id.
268. See brief of VMA, supra note 265, at 30-34.
269. See id. at 34-37.
270. See id at 35.
271. See id, at 36.
272. See id. at 37-38.
273. An amicus curiae brief was submitted on behalf of the National
Independent Energy Producers, Ogden Martin Systems of Montgomery, Inc.,
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selling electricity and steam for utilities.2 74 Together, the
NIEP and OMS claimed that the EPA's interpretation of the
CAA will result in problems with permit programs in Vir-
ginia and across the country.275 In addition to challenging
the reasonableness of the EPA's interpretation of the CAA,
the NIEP and OMS argued that the EPA's interpretation of
the CAA results in an "unconstitutional invasion of state sov-
ereignty."276 The NIEP and OMS concluded that Congress's
intention to alter the balance of power between states and the
federal government is ambiguous, thereby offending constitu-
tional law as interpreted in Gregory v. Ashcroft277 by the
Supreme Court.278
B. Virginia v. Browner
The first constitutional issue addressed by the Fourth
Circuit was whether Congress had a constitutional basis for
including the sanction provisions in the CAA in the first
place.2 79 In answer to this inquiry, the court determined that
the authority for the highway sanctions can be found in both
the Spending Clause,280 which permits Congress to provide
for the "general welfare" of the country, and the Commerce
Ogden Martin Systems of Fairfax, Inc., Ogden Martin Systems of Lancaster,
Inc. and Ogden Martin Systems of Alexandria/Arlington, Inc. See infra note
274.
274. See brief of Amicus Curiae National Independent Energy Producers;
Ogden Martin Systems of Montgomery, Inc.; Ogden Martin Systems of Fairfax,
Inc.; Ogden Martin Systems of Lancaster, Inc.; Ogden Martin Systems of Alex-
andria/Arlington, Inc. at 1, Virginia v. Browner 8 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995) (No.
95-1052) [hereinafter Brief of NIEP].
275. See id at 1-2.
276. See id. at 17-18.
277. See 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
278. See brief of NIEP, supra note 274, at 19-20. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the
Supreme Court, ruling on an equal protection claim, discussed the balance of
power between federal and state governments. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 457-64 (1991). The Court noted that a "healthy balance of power" was
necessary to "reduce the risk of tyranny or abuse" from either State or govern-
ments. See id. at 458. Noting that the balance of power tends to tip in favor of
the federal government due to the Supremacy Clause, in order for Congress to
alter the existing balance, it must make its intentions to do so perfectly clear.
See id. at 460.
279. See Virginia 11, 80 F.3d at 880-81.
280. See supra note 7 for the text of the Spending Clause.
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Clause, 28 ' which allows Congress to regulate commerce be-
tween the states.28 2
The Fourth Circuit quickly dismissed Virginia's conten-
tion that the judicial review requirements in CAA section
502(b)(6) unconstitutionally force states through, inter alia,
the judicial review requirements to give up control of their
courts to the federal government. 283 The court recognized
that a state cannot be commanded to open up its courts to
federal claims, but reminded that existing state courts must
hear federal claims under the Supremacy Clause.28 4 The
Supremacy Clause states that the "Constitution[ ] and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or the Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."28 5 Virginia's claim was determined to be
without merit, because a state need not expand its standing
statute if the EPA instituted a permit program where judicial
review could be had in federal court.286 The court went on to
state that the Congress may use its constitutional powers to
coax states into legislating or regulating in a certain way.28 7
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that the power to
persuade cannot be stretched so far as to place a stranglehold
on the states, the court pointed out that "[n]o court [ ] has
ever struck down a federal statute on grounds that it ex-
ceeded the Spending Power."288
With regard to the highway sanctions, the court gave two
reasons why that provision of the CAA does not amount to
unconstitutional coercion.28 9 First, the court noted that the
sanctions only apply to nonattainment areas and that funds
may still be obtained for projects that are outside nonattain-
281. See supra note 8 for the text of the Tenth Amendment.
282. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 881.
283. See id. at 880-81.
284. See i&. at 880. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
285. U.S. CoNsT. art VI, c. 2.
286. See Virginia II, 80 F.3d at 881.
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See id.
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ment areas. 290 Second, the court pointed to the fact that
safety projects and projects designed to reduce air pollution
could still be funded with federal dollars while the sanctions
are in effect.291 To round out its analysis, the court cited sev-
eral cases in which a total ban on funding was found not to
violate the Spending Clause.292 In response to Virginia's ar-
gument that it would have to manipulate other sources of
funding to cover any affected projects, the court replied that
the states were given plenty of time to plan their approach to
CAA compliance. 293 In concluding its brief discussion of the
constitutionality of the highway sanction, the court decided
that, due to the comprehensive nature of the CAA, there was
a rational relationship between highway funding and the re-
duction of air pollution.294 The court did not come to this con-
clusion through a rigorous analysis using South Dakota v.
Dole,29 5 but merely stated its findings in a rather conclusory
fashion.2 96
While the Fourth Circuit dealt with the constitutionality
of the highway sanctions in a mere six paragraphs, it took
even less time to decide that the offset sanctions also did not
offend the Constitution. The simple reasoning given by the
court was that offsets are imposed directly on the sources
themselves rather than on the state.2 97 For this reason, the
court concluded that Virginia is not being regulated as a gov-
ernment and, in fact, is not being regulated at all.298 There-
290. See id. at 881.
291. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 881.
292. See id. at 881-82 (citing New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408;
Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. den. 493 U.S. 1070 (1990);
Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nebraska Dep't of Roads
v. Tiemann, 510 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1975)).
293. See id. at 882.
294. See id.
295. 483 U.S. 203.
296. See infra section mI.C for a discussion of the Eastern District of Mis-
souri's slightly more probing constitutional analysis.
297. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 882. See infra notes 326-27 and accompany-
ing text.
298. See id
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fore, the court concluded that the offset sanctions do not
violate the Tenth Amendment.299
For the final topic of its discussion, the court turned its
attention to the federal operating permit program (FOPP)
provisions in the CAA.300 The court compared the FOPP pro-
visions to the threat of a federal regulatory program in Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n301 and con-
cluded that the situations were practically identical.30 2 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that since the Supreme Court de-
clared in Hodel that Congress may use its powers of preemp-
tion as an incentive for states to regulate in the area of
surface mining, that same power is applicable in the context
of the CAA.303 The Fourth Circuit then noted that even
though Congress had previously tried to use mandatory lan-
guage with regard to state promulgation of SIPs, those provi-
sions were judicially challenged and were severely criticized
by the court and eventually amended prior to resolution of
that challenge.30 4 The Virginia III court found the current
language which merely threatens the states with federal pre-
emption to be "less drastic" and well within constitutional
bounds.305
There were several issues that the court did not address,
even though such issues were raised in the briefs of either the
parties or their respective amici. First, the court did not dis-
cuss whether it was compelled to find a way to construe the
sanctions provisions in a constitutional manner, as suggested
by the EPA3 06 and the CBF.307 Second, the court did not ana-
lyze whether, as asserted by Virginia,30 8 the combination of
sanctions violated the Constitution even if each sanction
alone was permissible. Finally, the court devoted a mere sen-
299. See id.
300. See Virginia III, 80 F.3d at 882-83.
301. 452 U.S. 264. See supra note 126 for a summary of the Hodel decision.
302. See Virginia IfI, 80 F.3d at 882.
303. See id. at 882-83.
304. See id. at 883.
305. See id
306. See supra text accompanying note 234.
307. See supra text accompanying note 249.
308. See supra text accompanying note 223.
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tence to the issue of accountability of federal and state gov-
ernment officials.30 9
C. Missouri v. United States
The state of Missouri raised many of the same constitu-
tional arguments in a United States district court action310
based on the EPA's finding that the state failed to submit sev-
eral required SIP revisions.31 ' First, Missouri charged that
highway sanctions violate both the Spending Clause and the
Tenth Amendment. 31 2 Second, Missouri claimed that the off-
set sanctions violate the Tenth Amendment.313 The state re-
quested a declaration of unconstitutionality and a permanent
injunction against the use of the two sanctions.31 4 After dis-
cussing the EPA's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and concluding, by distinguishing Virginia I, that
a district court had jurisdiction over Missouri's claims, the
court turned its attention to the constitutional arguments.31 5
The court began its discussion of Missouri's constitu-
tional claims by dealing with the question of whether the
claims were ripe for determination. Ripeness was an issue
for the court because the offset sanctions went into effect af-
ter the complaint was filed and the highway sanctions had
309. See Virginia 111, 80 F.3d at 883 (quoting New York v. United States, 112
S. Ct. at 2424, by stating that "[i]f sanctions are imposed, it will be 'the Federal
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be
federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detri-
mental or unpopular.m ).
310. Although successful in convincing the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia that a constitutional claim coupled with a chal-
lenge of EPA action belonged in a United States Court of Appeals, EPA was not
able to persuade the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri that a district court did not have jurisdiction over Missouri's constitu-
tional attack on the CAA sanction provisions. See Missouri v. United States,
918 F. Supp. 1320, 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). Missouri's complaint followed EPA's
threat of sanctions for Missouri's failure to submit required SIP revisions; how-
ever, the opinion of the Eastern District of Missouri is devoid of any indication
that Missouri brought anything other than pure constitutional claims. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 1326.
313. See id.
314. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1326.
315. See id. at 1327-28.
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not gone into effect at the time the court's decision was ren-
dered.3 16 To decide the ripeness issue, the court analyzed the
Tenth Amendment claims separate from the Spending Clause
claims.317 The court quickly concluded that since the offset
sanctions had been imposed and highway funding sanctions
were imminent3 1 8 and the issues involved were purely legal,
the Tenth Amendment challenges to both sanctions were
ripe. 31 9
While characterizing Missouri's Tenth Amendment
claims as purely facial attacks on the CAA, the court deter-
mined that the Spending Clause arguments were both facial
and as-applied claims which needed to be addressed indepen-
dently.320 Missouri's argument that the highway sanctions
are not "rationally related to the purpose of highway spend-ing" was a purely facial challenge, according to the court,
and, as such, was ripe for the same reasons that the Tenth
Amendment claims were ripe.321 However, Missouri's argu-
ment that the highway sanctions were so burdensome that
they violated the Spending Clause was characterized by the
court as an unripe, as-applied claim since it was unclear how
individual projects would be affected by the funding
restrictions. 322
Although it found the as-applied challenge to the high-
way sanctions to be unripe, the court still expressed its opin-
ion on the merits of such a claim.3 23 Citing, inter alia, the
United States Supreme Court, the Eastern District of Mis-
souri voiced its doubt that a state would be able to success-
fully argue that a court should undertake an intensive
investigation of the state's finances and conclude that Con-
316. See idi at 1328-29 (noting that ripeness is determined at time the court
considers the issue, rather than at the time of filing).
317. See id
318. The court noted that the highway fund sanctions were due to go into
effect on July 6, 1996, if Missouri failed to comply with the CAA requirements
by that date. See id. at 1329.
319. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1329.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id. at 1329-30.
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gress' decision to withhold certain federal funds would have
such an adverse effect on the state's economy as to be
unconstitutional. 324
After resolving the ripeness issue, the Eastern District of
Missouri addressed the merits of Missouri's facial attack on
the highway and offset sanctions of the CAA.32 5 The court
quickly disposed of Missouri's challenge to the offset sanc-
tions by pointing to the fact that, under the Commerce
Clause, Congress may impose restrictions on air pollution
sources directly or prevent a state from issuing a permit to a
pollution source when the permit does not comply with the
CAA.326 The court further noted that CAA section
113(a)(5)32 7 gave the EPA the power to prevent construction
or modification of major sources of air pollution in contraven-
tion of the CAA requirements and prohibitions. 328 Therefore,
the court concluded, the EPA could impose 2:1 offsets itself
regardless of whether a state is implementing a new source
review or permit program.329
In contrast to the simple resolution of the constitutional-
ity of the offset sanctions, the court launched into a more de-
tailed Spending Clause analysis to resolve the controversy
over the highway sanctions.330 Since the main question was
the relationship between the purpose of highway funding and
the withholding of that funding in cases where states do not
comply with the CAA, the court focused its attention on this
issue. Rejecting Missouri's argument that highway funding
must directly relate to air pollution for the highway sanctions
to pass constitutional muster, the court cited New York v.
324. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1330 (citing Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d
445 (9th Cir. 1989) as supporting the argument that states are always able to
raise funds by taxing their own citizens).
325. See id. at 1330-36.
326. See id. at 1332.
327. See CAA § 113(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5). This provision of the CAA
states that if a state is not complying with any requirements imposed upon new
or modified sources, EPA may "issue an order prohibiting the construction or
modification of any major stationary source in any area to which such require-
ment applies." Id.
328. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1332.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 1332-36.
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United States3 3 ' when it concluded that there need only be
asome relationship" between federal funding and any condi-
tion imposed on receipt of that funding.332 According to the
court, this relationship existed based on stated purposes of
both the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
and the CAA. 3 33
After finding that a sufficient relationship existed be-
tween highway funding and the CAA conditions, the court ad-
dressed Missouri's argument that the sanctions were
irrational because they would have a negative effect on the
state's air quality.33 4 This claimed adverse effect was that
the failure to fund highway projects in the state would lead to
greater traffic congestion and higher emissions.33 5 The court
rejected this rationale based on the enumerated exceptions to
the highway sanctions, noting in a footnote that Missouri was
not entitled to the funds and could not place its own condi-
tions on their receipt.33 6 The court further articulated that
the judiciary "should not substitute its judgment for that of
Congress" and that it was sufficient that the sanctions were
reasonably calculated to further the common good and control
air pollution.33 7 The court refused to consider this relation-
ship based on Missouri's own economic condition and trans-
portation needs by characterizing this as an as-applied
analysis which it had already determined to be unripe.338
After considering the sanctions separately, the court pro-
ceeded to address whether a combination of sanctions was
unconstitutional. 33 9 The court answered this question in the
negative.3 40 The reason given was that the Supreme Court,
in New York v. United States,3 4' did not articulate that such a
331. See 112 S. Ct. 2408.
332. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333.
333. See id. at 1333-34.
334. See id. at 1335.
335. See id.
336. See fd. at 1335 & n.20.
337. Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1336.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 1336-37.
340. See id.
341. See 112 S. Ct. 2408.
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combination would violate the constitution.3 42 The Missouri
court reasoned that even though a state may face the possi-
bility of double sanctions and even federal regulation, it still
had a choice to exercise. 343
The court concluded its opinion by rejecting Missouri's
argument that the sanctions are unconstitutional because
they place an undue burden on state legislators who will be
wrongly blamed for the adverse action against the state.344
The court specifically pointed to Missouri's own legislation
enacting a CAA program which stated that "'[tihis [certifica-
tion] cost is mandated by your United States Congress.'" 345
Thus, the final theory for finding the statutes unconstitu-
tional was rejected, slamming the lid on all of Missouri's fa-
cial attacks on the CAA.
IV. ANALYSIS
By merely studying the arguments raised by the parties
and amici, the constitutional claims addressed to the Fourth
Circuit and the Eastern District of Missouri may seem quite
complex and incapable of a simple solution. The states and
supporting amici have made impassioned arguments about
state sovereignty and the fall of federalism. Highway fund-
ing limitations and offset provisions are characterized as a
method of torture rather than as an incentive. Fortunately,
as reasoned by the Fourth Circuit, resolution of these claims
turns on a simple analysis of the methods Congress employed
to convince the states to enact an approvable program. Un-
fortunately, the analysis presented by the Fourth Circuit was
too simple and ineffective in many respects.
While the Eastern District of Missouri partially makes
up for the lack of analysis on the Fourth Circuit's part, the
latter, more powerful court seems to have passed up a golden
opportunity to resolve a major issue through rigorous analy-
sis. On the other hand, perhaps the Fourth Circuit knew ex-
342. See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1336.
343. See id. at 1337.
344. See id.
345. Id.
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actly what it was doing. Virginia blitzed the judicial system
with multiple constitutional and administrative law argu-
ments in a two-front war in the Eastern District of Virginia
and the Fourth Circuit. The two Virginia federal courts prop-
erly focused the issues into one tribunal and proceeded to
take the easiest route possible to reach the result necessary
to maintain some stability in the realm of environmental law.
Maybe the Fourth Circuit's decision is yet another example of
how one should be careful of what he asks for since it could
backfire.
The remainder of this section sets forth a more rigorous
analysis of the constitutional issues and provides some addi-
tional factual and policy reasons supporting the ultimate
findings of the Missouri and Virginia III courts. The main
purpose is to fill in gaps left by the decisions and fortify any
questionable reasoning.
A. Clarification of the Constitutional Issues
As the Fourth Circuit properly noted, there is no need to
discuss whether Congress can force Virginia to expand its ju-
risdiction statute since case law has firmly established that
federal government cannot require states to legislate.346
However, this is not really an issue. The CAA does not re-
quire states to grant Article III standing.3 47 The CAA, like
the LLRWPAA, merely uses a series of incentives to persuade
the states to enact a program which meets minimum federal
standards, including Article III standing. In fact, it can be
argued that Congress could not have meant for the permit
program to be a direct mandate since, as the CBF indi-
cated,3 48 the method of last resort is preemption and not
some type of enforcement mechanism. Therefore, the consti-
tutional question is not whether requiring states to provide
Article III standing violates the Tenth Amendment, but
whether Congress can use the threat of CAA section 179
sanctions to encourage states to legislate accordingly. New
346. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 8 for a discussion of Article III standing.
348. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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York v. United States is directly on point, but neither the
Fourth Circuit nor the Eastern District of Missouri used this
powerful case to its fullest potential by actually comparing
the statutes at issue in both cases. Such a comparison may
serve to demonstrate that the CAA sanctions are not as dras-
tic as they might initially appear.
B. Comparing the CAA Sanction Provisions with the
Incentives Used in the LLRWPAA
In many respects, the CAA operating permit program is
quite similar to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
Amendments (LLRWPAA) at issue in New York v. United
States.349 In both statutes, Congress acknowledged that the
situation it sought to address was national in scope but re-
quired cooperation between the federal government and the
states in order to effectively solve the problem. Air pollution,
like disposal of low-level radioactive waste, can have devas-
tating effects on the environment yet, at the same time, it is
unrealistic for businesses to completely stop generating
either form of pollution. Due to the business and ecological
characteristics unique to each state, Congress acted properly
in encouraging states to deal directly with both problems.
Similarly, Congress recognized that states needed strong
incentives to regulate in controversial areas such as radioac-
tive waste disposal and air pollution control. The result was,
respectively, the LLRWPAA and the CAA operating permit
program.
In both statutes, Congress conditioned the receipt of fed-
eral monies on state legislative actions. Under the
LLRWPAA, return of the funds placed in escrow with the
Secretary of Energy was conditioned upon compliance with
the statute. Similarly, under the CAA, the granting of cer-
tain federal highway funding is contingent upon submission
of an approvable operating permit program.
Congress also provided for restrictions on business oper-
ations under both the LLRWPAA and the CAA. According to
349. See 112 S. Ct. 2408. See supra section IID.1 of this Comment for an
extensive discussion of New York v. United States.
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the LLRWPAA, businesses could have access to disposal sites
drastically reduced or even denied completely. Likewise,
under the CAA, new or modified stationary sources could be-
come subject to 2:1 offsets before obtaining a construction
permit. However, the similarity between the incentives in
the two statutes ends there. Under the LLRWPAA, Con-
gress went too far and attempted to require states failing to
enact federally sanctioned legislation to take title to waste
generated within their borders and assume liability for dam-
ages related to the disposal of that waste. The CAA, on the
other hand, employs the judicially sanctioned method of fed-
eral preemption as its final incentive for states to participate
in the operating permit program.
Unlike the statutory scheme of the LLRWPAA, each of
the incentives in the CAA can be shown to pass constitutional
muster under the reasoning in New York v. United States.
Since there is no doubt that federal preemption of state law is
constitutional, 350 only the offset sanctions and the highway
funding restrictions require further constitutional analysis.
C. Analysis of the CAA incentive program under New
York v. United States and South Dakota v. Dole
The first set of CAA incentives, the offset provisions,
meet the test of independent constitutionality set out by the
Supreme Court in New York. As the EPA pointed out in its
reply brief and the Missouri and Virginia III courts acknowl-
edged in its opinions, the offsets are imposed directly to the
sources themselves when applying for a construction per-
mit.351 This is an examaple of direct regulation by a federal
agency through Congress' Commerce power and nothing
more can be argued on this point.
The second set of CAA incentives, the highway fund re-
strictions, is a constitutional exercise of the congressional
Spending power. The controlling case regarding Congress'
authority under the Spending Clause is South Dakota v.
350. See supra notes 159, 301-05 and accompanying text.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 246, 297, and 326-29.
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Dole352. Although the Virginia III court mentions Dole when
discussing the Spending Clause as a source of Congressional
power, it neglects to address the Dole test in any meaningful
manner. The Missouri court purports to perform a Dole anal-
ysis but fails to completely satisfy the need for a clear appli-
cation of the test.
As the Missouri court indicates, in order for the use of
highway sanctions to be constitutional, this provision must
meet each of the four requirements set out in Dole.353 First,
Congress must be spending for the general welfare.354 Sec-
ond, conditions placed on the funding must be clear enough to
give states enough information to make an informed
choice.3 55 Third, the spending must relate to the national in-
terest Congress seeks to further.356 Finally, there cannot be
an independent constitutional bar to the action Congress
seeks to encourage.3 57
Although not discussed by either the Missouri or Vir-
ginia III courts, the first two prongs of the Dole test are easily
met, the Virginia III and Missouri courts agree. First, high-
way funding, without a doubt, benefits the general public.
Safe, efficient highways are necessary in today's mobile soci-
ety. Second, the condition that the CAA places on receipt of
that funding, namely that states enact an approvable permit
program, is unambiguous. If the EPA disapproves of a state's
submission, a decision which, as is the case with Virginia, is
subject to judicial review, the eighteen-month sanction clock
begins to tick. The fact that the EPA must provide a list of
reasons for disapproval in its proposal358 effectively places
the state on notice regarding what action it must take to meet
CAA requirements.
352. See 483 U.S. 203. See supra section JI.D.2 of this Comment for a discus-
sion of South Dakota v. Dole.
353. See Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. at 1332.
354. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 59.
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With regard to the third requirement that the conditions
relate to the purpose of the funding, both Missouri and Vir-
ginia had argued that this requirement was not met.35 9 The
Virginia III court cited the comprehensiveness of the CAA as
justification for finding that the third prong of the Dole test
was met.360 The Missouri court delved slightly deeper but
limited its analysis to whether there was "some" relationship
between the condition and the funding.3 61
This third Dole condition concerning the relationship be-
tween the funding and Congress's national policy can, how-
ever, be more definitely satisfied.3 62 The Dole Court stated
that the conditions might be unacceptable if they are not re-
lated to the given federal purpose.363 The Court then pro-
ceeded to conclude that creating a uniform drinking age was
sufficiently related to "one of the main purposes for which
highway funds are extended - safe interstate travel."364 This
language in suggests a rather broad construction, perhaps
providing some justification for the Fourth Circuit's con-
clusory examination of the issue.
The situation in the present case appears to be the re-
verse of that in Dole. Although the denial of federal highway
funding is directly related to air pollution control since creat-ing bigger highways will arguably increase volume on those
highways and contribute to increases in air pollution, Dole
could be interpreted to mean that it is only the purpose of the
funding itself and not the purpose of the denial of such fund-
ing that must relate to the specified condition. Therefore, to
359. See supra notes 294 and 332 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
362. At least one commentator, William J. Klein, has proposed that the CAA
highway sanctions arguably do not meet this third requirement. See William J.
Klein, Note, Pressure or Compulsion? Federal Highway Sanctions of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, 26 RuTGERs L. J. 855, 866-68 (1995). Klein claims
that the reduction of air pollution does not relate to highway safety so the sanc-
tion provisions of the CAA do not pass the Dole test. See id. at 868. However,
Klein concedes that the Court would probably conclude that enough of a rela-
tionship existed to justify the conditions given the "relatively low relatedness
standard" set by the Court. See id.
363. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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allow the CAA program to stand, a purpose of granting of fed-
eral highway funds must be to reduce air pollution.
The relationship between denying highway funding and
promoting cleaner air has been met by legislative enactments
under the Title 23 of the United States Code. The CBF points
specifically to the Intermodal Surface Transportation Effi-
ciency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), which is codified in various parts
of the United States Code, as an example.3 65 As pointed out
by the CBF, one of the main purposes of this act is to create a
transportation plan that is environmentally-friendly. How-
ever, the fact that the ISTEA was enacted subsequent to the
CAA weakens this argument.
Fortunately, the ISTEA was not the first time that Con-
gress evinced its intention to link highway funding to the
CAA. As mentioned previously, the Secretary of Transporta-
tion has been required to take the CAA air quality standards
and SIPs into account since 1970.366 The Federal-Aid High-
way Act of 1970367 expressly directed the Secretary of Trans-
portation to consult with the EPA and promulgate guidelines
which would require that highway programs be "consistent
with any approved plan for the implementation of any ambi-
ent air quality standard for any air quality control region des-
ignated pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended."368
Thus, Congress long ago decided that it wanted a highway
system which would promote cleaner air.
The relationship between the CAA and highway funding
is further strengthened by the fact that Congress has not em-
powered the EPA to require the withholding of funds specifi-
cally aimed at reducing air pollution, such as construction of
HOV lanes and trip reduction programs.369 Congress recog-
nized that the control of air pollution cannot displace high-
365. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 259.
367. Federal-Aid Highway Act, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713 (1970)(codified in various sections of Title 23 of the United States Code).
368. Id. § 136(b) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §109(g).
369. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text for specific examples of
environmentally sound construction projects which may continue to be funded
notwithstanding imposition of CAA § 179 sanctions.
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way safety programs by providing CAA section 179
exemptions for highway safety programs. 3 7 0
The Dole Court merely stated that the conditions might
be unconstitutional if they are not related to the federal pur-
pose. This very language indicates that the Court would be
receptive to creative uses of federal funding incentives. The
strong policy reasons, discussed below, favor the statutory
federal-state interaction set out in the CAA and should serve
to sway a reluctant court. Thus, there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between certain federal highway funds and the with-
holding thereof and air pollution control. This relationship is
certainly strong enough to satisfy the Supreme Court's test in
Dole.
The CAA highway sanctions also satisfy the final prong
of the Dole analysis. Dole recognized that, under Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Service Commission, the Tenth Amend-
ment cannot act as a constitutional bar to conditions on fed-
eral spending unless Congress attempted to encourage the
states to act unconstitutionally themselves.371 This is not the
case here. Virginia would not be violating the Constitution
by allowing those individuals who meet the requirements of
Article III standing an opportunity for judicial review of final
permit actions. Therefore, Virginia cannot claim that the
highway fund restrictions are invalid under the Tenth
Amendment since all four requirements of Dole are met.
Having established that each of the incentives for states
to enact an acceptable operating permit program are inde-
pendently constitutional, it should follow that the CAA
passes the test set out in New York v. United States. Virginia
and Missouri complained, however, that Congress should
only be able use one incentive at a time while the CAA high-
way funding and offset sanctions remain in place even if the
EPA is required to implement a federal program. Although
the Virginia III court does not even address this argument,
the Missouri court does. As the Eastern District of Missouri
370. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
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points out,372 putting two constitutional actions together does
not necessarily make the result unconstitutional. The New
York v. United States Court specifically noted that preemp-
tion and the Spending power were not the only methods Con-
gress could employ to encourage states to legislate according
to federal policy. Thus, it appears the Court left the door
open for more creative solutions.
The current set-up combining the sanctions and federal
preemption is, in fact, necessary. The CAA imposes sanctions
eighteen months after the expiration of the deadline for pro-
gram submissions and implements a federal program after
twenty-four months. Under this scheme, sanctions are only
in place for six short months before the federal program takes
effect. This is hardly an incentive for states to develop an ap-
provable program. Since states are better able to juggle their
own policy concerns and the needs of local businesses, the
sanctions must remain in place even while a federal program
is being implemented to provide as much incentive as possi-
ble. The desired result is state administration but federal
preemption alone may not be a strong enough inducement.
An additional justification for using a federal program in
conjunction with the sanctions is that, as the Virginia I court
pointed out, the sanctions clock may be stopped and reset
even while the preemption clock ticks on.3 73 It may be possi-
ble that a state could avoid the sanctions for three years fol-
lowing an EPA finding of failure to submit a required
program or revision by merely submitting, in the seventeen
month after the EPA finding, a complete program which it
suspects will fall short of the CAA requirements. In such a
case, the finding of completeness resets the sanction clock to
zero, requiring an additional eighteen month term before
sanctions will be imposed.
It is proper for courts to resist attempts to establish a
slippery slope upon which to judge federal regulatory pro-
grams. Since each state would be affected quite differently by
each of the incentives, it makes sense to draw the line at con-
372. See supra notes 339-43 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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stitutionality rather than some arbitrary point at which the
individual state cannot take the pressure. The court in New
York v. United States took the former position. In New York
v. United States, there was no discussion as to whether an
individual state would be arguably more affected than the
rest by disposal site surcharges or access restrictions. Nor
would the New York v. United States Court allow the uncon-
stitutional take title provision to stand in the face of state
acceptance. The Constitution was the standard by which to
measure the incentives. To be consistent with the letter and
spirit of New York v. United States, the determination of in-
dependent constitutionality for each of the sanction provi-
sions should be the end of the issue. The policy concerns are
best left to the legislatures and not the courts.
Unfortunately, the Missouri and Virginia III courts both
dropped the ball with respect to the establishment of a slip-
pery slope. The Missouri court left the door open for future
discussion of this issue by dismissing Missouri's as-applied
claims without prejudice. The Virginia III court failed to
even address this important issue. The Fourth Circuit should
have put the question to rest rather than ignoring it.
In summary, while the results reached by both the
Fourth Circuit and the Eastern District of Missouri were cor-
rect, the decisions themselves were not what they could have
been. The Fourth Circuit in particular failed to address
many important issues raised by the parties and their amici.
In the end, however, this may be best for the United States,
which got the answer it was looking for in a rather concise
manner. However, given the recent OWA regulations which
again bring the issue of Article III standing in state courts to
the forefront, one can only wonder if a new controversy is ripe
for development. While the CWA provides no real incentive
for states to enact an SPDES program, it is possible that Con-
gress, pleased with results in Virginia III and Missouri,
might see fit to amend the CWA to dangle a carrot or two in
front of the states. If Congress does so amend the CWA or if
another state decides to challenge the CAA sanctions, the
new question becomes whether the decisions of the Fourth
Circuit and the Eastern District of Missouri are strong
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enough to withstand another attack. While the policy is cer-
tainly there, the reasoning given in the opinions is not on
solid ground.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Virginia III and Missouri decisions are a
wake-up call to the states that the federal government is seri-
ous about which entities should administer environmental
statutes, the two decisions should also cause industry groups
like VMA and NIEP to reconsider their positions. These
groups fail to realize that attacking the current set-up will
not benefit them, but could ultimately result in federal pre-
emption, or worse. As pointed out above, the Supreme Court
appears willing to accept new methods of encouraging states
to legislate according congressional plan.
Although business is concerned about the burdens that
the program appears to place on them, some of these concerns
are misplaced. For example, although VMA complains about
permit fees, 374 the imposition of fees in order to run the pro-
gram is an external cost which would likely be passed on to
customers anyway. Second, business is complaining about
being held hostage pending resolution of the case, but does
not consider the fact that the federal government can, and
eventually must, step in to regulate in face of the state's fail-
ure to do so properly. A state agency, placed in power by that
state's citizens, will arguably be more receptive to the con-
cerns of local business than the EPA Administrator selected
by the President. Furthermore, since the EPA has oversight
authority with regard to all permits that are issued, any per-
son who meets the requirements of Article III standing can
challenge the permit simply by petitioning the EPA to veto it
and then seeking judicial review if the EPA declines.
Although the scope of review of the EPA's decision not to veto
a permit may not be as comprehensive as review of a state
agency's decision to issue a permit, industry still remains un-
sure of its obligations regardless of whether judicial review is
available in state court. However, Congress took great pains
374. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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in drafting the 1990 Amendments to minimize or eliminate
uncertainty regarding compliance. The current system is far
better than the pre-1990 CAA given the fact that it is un-
likely that environmental regulation will disappear any time
soon.
State government also benefits from administering the
program. Jobs are created for state residents. The program
is funded by the permitees. States concerned with their busi-
nesses' ability to compete in interstate commerce can enact
the minimum program elements. Private citizens and busi-
nesses alike decide among themselves how to balance the
competing interests. Finally, the federal government, having
done the job required of it by all citizens by providing the
proper guidance, steps back, retaining only oversight author-
ity, to deal with other problems of national concern. This is
cooperative federalism at its best.
The Fourth Circuit and the Eastern District of Missouri
correctly concluded that Congress has properly exercised its
Commerce and Spending powers and has not run afoul of the
Tenth Amendment. Declaring the operating permit program
to be unconstitutional could have serious ramifications both
economically and environmentally.
It is clear that the states are the proper vehicles for pol-
lution control regulation. Each state is unique in its geogra-
phy and business climate. States are ultimately responsible
to their own citizens while the federal government is respon-
sible to all citizens of the United States. Although the busi-
nesses submitting amicus briefs fear that the broad reach of
Article IlI standing will unduly burden the permit process,
these same businesses should be wary of what they are ask-
ing. The individual needs of businesses and state citizens
could easily get lost in the bureaucratic mess that would re-
sult if the EPA was forced to implement an operating permit
program in each individual state. The fact that so many
states have voluntarily submitted programs that substan-
tially or fully comply with the requirements of the CAA375 is
375. See supra note 103 for a discussion of the status of state submission of
operating permit programs.
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evidence that state officials recognize their important role in
protecting the interests of local industries and the health and
safety of their citizens.
While the individual needs of the state are important, it
is also necessary to guard against nonuniformity in dealing
with air pollution. If Congress were not allowed to provide
for certain minimum elements of an operating permit pro-
gram, states would be given broad power to choose between
regulating air pollution and attracting businesses. Given
this power, a financially strapped state would almost cer-
tainly regulate as little as possible and create a bureaucracy
which is favorable to business and hostile to public participa-
tion. Voters would be forced to choose between breathing
cleaner air or losing their jobs because companies will opt to
do business in states where they are least likely to face nu-
merous citizen suits.
While it might be argued that it is the state's citizens
who elect the officials that will ultimately make that policy
choice, air pollution is a national problem and will continue to
be national in scope for the simple reason that air pollution
does not recognize state boundaries. People living in adjacent
states cannot shut themselves off from upwind pollution.
Likewise, people traveling interstate cannot shield them-
selves from the pollution assented to by another state's citi-
zens. Everyone must recognize that it takes the
particularized knowledge of the states and the broad powers
of the federal government to give everyone, including busi-
nesses, a chance to prosper economically in a healthier envi-
ronment. Therefore, we must think very carefully about
what we ask for, since we just might get it.
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